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Executive Summary
The battle over legislation to grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) with the U.S.
was perhaps the costliest political fight ever waged on Capitol Hill.  The corporate campaign had to
overcome the 79% of the U.S. public which opposed enhancing U.S.-China trade terms absent
addressing human rights, religious freedom and labor conditions. In a stunning exhibit in the case
regarding the corrosive effect of money on the American political system, Congress passed PNTR over
this broad public opposition after an unprecedented corporate deluge of campaign cash, lobbying and
paid advertising. 
Public Citizen has found that just the most prominent corporations and business trade associations
involved in the fight spent at least $113.1 million to purchase power with campaign contributions, paid
lobbyists and “experts,” advertising and astroturf “grassroots” on PNTR. To put this in perspective, the
corporate campaign contributions we were able to find were double those of either the massive
corporate NAFTA or health care campaigns. The entire corporate “Harry and Louise” ad campaign
against the health care reform bill in 1993 cost $4 million and the entire NAFTA advertising campaign
cost $8 million.  In contrast, labor unions’ serious campaign to defeat PNTR was vastly outspent and
other PNTR opponents — chiefly Chinese dissidents, human rights activists, Tibetan activists,
environmentalists, consumer organizations, family farmers and religious groups — had very limited
resources.  
This stunning corporate purchase of PNTR approval was supplemented and directed by top priority
allocation of the full Clinton Administration resources to the effort. With President Clinton desperate to
shift focus from his impeachment to his foreign policy legacy, the Administration made an
unprecedented effort on PNTR, overshadowing the resources and zeal dedicated to top Democratic
party priorities, such as health care and labor law reform. Given the growing public opposition to its
trade policies, the Administration was required to use many times over the NAFTA-level of time and
effort by top level officials and the President. The degree to which the White House China War Room
coordinated the corporate campaigning was deemed by the Government Accounting Office to violate
the federal prohibition on the use of federal funds to exhort outside groups to lobby Congress.
The context into which the PNTR campaign fell also explains the intensity of the corporate- White
House crusade. For five years, their joint efforts to advance the corporate managed trade agenda had
met numerous defeats at the hands a growing citizens’ movement critical of international commercial
agreements that benefitted big business at the expense of ordinary people, small businesses and family
farms, and the environment.  The attempt to expand the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) by obtaining Fast Track authority was defeated twice, the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment was derailed, and the WTO expansion planned for the Seattle Ministerial ground to a halt
after a year-long international civil society “WTO: No New Round, Turnaround” campaign. While a
Don't Know, Refused
Pro-PNTR
No PNTR
Business Week/Harris Poll April 2000
Without Human/Labor Rights Protections
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PNTR victory would not overcome the political shift realized by the critics’ string of wins, a loss would
announce that the corporate managed trade agenda had not only lost its momentum, but that it was
dead.
Recognizing that they had substantially underestimated their opponents’ strength and the shift in U.S.
public opinion, the corporate managed trade advocates thus concocted an unprecedented campaign to
purchase the outcome they could not win on the merits. This report documents how over $113 million
was spent to over-ride strong public opposition to a special interest agenda:
C significantly increasing campaign contributions to incumbents, parties and conventions; 
C creating additional cash incentives to betray the folks at home, such as promises to hold
industry-wide fund raisers for targeted Members; 
C a swarm of  high-dollar lobbyists including former Administration and Hill staff, former
Congresspeople and famous “spokespeople with special access and more campaign cash;”
C a costly grassroots astroturf operation including endless pre-paid fly-in visits by recruited
“local” pro-PNTR constituents and non-stop paid phone banks to give the impression of local
pro-PNTR activity;
C an aggressive national and local paid media radio, print and tv advertising campaign; 
C a bottomless pit of PR spending ranging from flying from China model “workers” to hiring
hundreds of college kids for pro-PNTR “rallies;” and
C hiring a retinue of seemingly-objective foreign policy experts for press work and hearings who
never revealed their connections to business interests in
China
The overwhelming wave of campaign cash and the
intensity of the corporate PR and “experts” onslaught 
allowed the corporate-White House team to implement a
massive disinformation offensive.  The Big Lie pushed
was that the U.S. would lose out on all potential benefits
of China’s WTO entry if PNTR were denied.  The White
House used its bully pulpit quite literally, waging a media
campaign of misinformation that downplayed the
concerns of the majority of Americans while ignoring the
skyrocketing trade deficit the U.S. has with China, now
at nearly $70 billion a year.  Yet, once U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky was forced to
admit under questioning at the House Ways and Means Committee that U.S. businesses would obtain
the tariff cuts of China’s WTO accession even without PNTR, much of Congress was so well
marinated in corporate cash that substance no longer mattered.
Z The most prominent PNTR supporters spent $31.2 million on lobbying
Congress in the first half of 2000.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce spent $9.66
million during the first half of 2000 with more than half of its 45 registered lobbyists worked on
PNTR.  Major trade association proponent, the Business Roundtable, spent $2.94 million
lobbying Congress the fist half of this year.  Motorola, which has already invested more than $3
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billion in Chinese manufacturing plants, spent $2.89 million lobbying Congress the first six
months of 2000, up substantially from 1999 and with PNTR becoming Motorola’s primary
legislative issue.  The American Farm Bureau Federation spent $1.5 million the first half of
2000 with a strong PNTR lobbying presence.  Boeing, a major PNTR supporter with
manufacturing operations in China and nearly 70% of the passenger jet aircraft market in China,
spent $4.24 million in lobbying in the first half of 2000.
Z Pro-PNTR corporations spent between $13-$15 million on paid advertising
alone, significantly more than was spent by PNTR opponents or on the
corporate campaigns promoting NAFTA or opposing the Clinton health care
plan.  The Business Roundtable, Chamber of Commerce, Lucent, Microsoft, Motorola,
ExxonMobil and others spent significant sums on print, radio and television advertising —
nearly seven times the $2 million spent by PNTR opponents.  The pro-PNTR advertising was
double spent by corporate managed trade forces on NAFTA.  The infamous “Harry and
Louise” anti health care reform tv ads cost $4 million over at year.
Z Pro-China PNTR business political contributions surged into campaign and
party coffers.  The companies that make up the pro-PNTR Business Roundtable alone
made $68.2 million in PAC, soft money and individual donations to Members of Congress and
the Democratic and Republican parties between January 1999 and May 2000, the month of the
PNTR vote. These donors made $4.2 million in soft money contributions in March alone,
double the amount given in February and more than 7% of the contributions since the beginning
of 1999.  The Business Roundtable donations alone overshadowed those by labor unions by
nearly 2 to 1, who gave only $31 million.
Z Pro-PNTR Political Funding Far Exceeded the other largest corporate
legislative battles this decade.  Pro-PNTR political giving was more than double what
was spent on political contributions by the corporate opponents of the Clinton health care plan
and two and a half times as much as was spent on political donations by companies promoting
NAFTA.
Z Leading corporate PNTR proponents accounted for 67% of the large
donations to fund this summer’s political conventions.  Prominent China PNTR
backers spent $9.35 million to fund the conventions including American International Group,
which gave $2 million to the Democratic convention and $500,000 to the Republican
convention, Microsoft which funded each convention to the tune of $1 million, and
telecommunications giant Motorola donating $1 million to the GOP gala. 
Z China business lobby’s paid astro-turf was used to create illusion of local
support for PNTR and counter broad public opposition.  Business trade
associations and individual companies paid for a smoke and mirrors campaign to simulate
public support for PNTR. The expensive operation involved recruiting one or two local political
or business leaders in target districts and flying them to Washington to show local support for
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PNTR, operating toll free phone lines to Congress with operators lobbying the corporate
retirees and others they called to pass through to congressional offices with monitoring to cut off
anti-PNTR calls, by mailing and e-mailing employees and subcontractors with messages linking
their future to PNTR passage and urging them to write Congress, by printing pro-PNTR
messages and exhortations to call Congress on paychecks, and by flying mangers and
employees to Washington in several orchestrated shows — from as far away as China. The
Business Roundtable purchased $40,000 worth of telephone cards with pro-PNTR messages
and phone numbers and hired temporary workers across the country to distribute them to
commuters imploring them to call their Members of Congress and urge a yes vote on PNTR.  
Z In addition to dedicating large in-house staffs to PNTR, the China business
lobby  hired former Members of Congress, Clinton administration officials
and political notables to lobby for PNTR.  The campaign involved the intense efforts
of a cast of characters inside and outside of government on behalf of a narrow special interest
coalition — many of whom typify the revolving door between government servants and
corporate consultants — also demonstrating many of conflict of interest problems that infect
American democracy.  At least six former members of Congress lobbied in favor of PNTR. 
Former Rep. Michael Kopetski (D-OR, Business Roundtable); former Rep. Dave McCurdy
(D-OK, Electronic Industries Association); Former Rep. and former governor Carroll
Campbell (R-SC, American Council of Life Insurers); former Rep. Vic Fazio (D-CA,
Microsoft); former Rep Vin Webber (D-MN, Microsoft); and former Rep. Ray McGrath (R-
NY, Boeing).  Additionally, former U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor represented
Aetna, America Online, Boeing and Citigroup on China PNTR and former Republican National
Committee Chairman Haley Barbour represented Microsoft on PNTR, Clinton Administration
Assistant Secretary of Defense Sandi Stuart represented Microsoft, and former Clinton
Administration Deputy Assistant Agriculture Secretary P. Scott Shearer.
Z China business lobby rented a major revolving door lobbying team.  The
Chamber of Commerce retained former Clinton White House Press Secretary Mike
McCurry’s firm Public Strategies to work on China in 1999 as well as Mayer, Brown & Platt,
the former firm of Commerce Secretary Daley, the White House’s point person on PNTR.  The
American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) hired podesta.com as consultants, which was
founded by White House Chief of Staff John Podesta.  ACLI’s lobbyist was Jeff Richetti,
brother of current White House Deputy Chief of Staff Steven Richetti, who as Daley’s deputy
on China PNTR was now placed inside the White House after representing such firms as Allied
signal on China trade.  Motorola retained O’Brien-Calio, the firm of former Assistant to
President Bush on NAFTA negotiations, Nicholas Calio, who also lobbied for Motorola on
China NTR. Many former Congressional staffers represented pro-PNTR corporations and
trade associations, including: former Senate Judiciary Counsel Marla Grossman (Microsoft);,
former Chief of Staff for Majority Whip Tome DeLay, William Jarrell (Microsoft); former
Assistant to Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, Ed Kutler (Microsoft); former House
Republican Conference Legislative Co-ordinator Brenda Reese (Boeing); and former Chief of
Staff to Sen. Max Baucus, David Castagnetti (Boeing) (chart p. 13, pp. 11-21)
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Z Pro-PNTR businesses and trade associations publicly practiced
contribution extortion.  Several lobbyists and CEOs were reported in the press making
threats to cut off campaign donations to those who opposed PNTR, while Rep. Merrill Cook
(R-UT) reported that he was offerred $200,000 to change his vote against PNTR.  Meanwhile,
pro-PNTR corporations lavished soft money on the two main political parties to encourage
active pro-PNTR leadership by the leadership and created new fronts through which to
increase donations.  For instance, a corporate-funded PAC established to fund pro-corporate
managed trade Democrats, called the New Democratic Network, raised $250,000 for pro-
PNTR Democrats.  Companies like Motorola, Boeing, AOL and Citigroup actively plied
undecided or wavering Members with campaign contributions, even organizing or promising
special fund raisers.
Z White House PNTR lobbying efforts substantially exceeded efforts to pass
NAFTA.  The White House threw all of its weight behind passing PNTR in the House,
including most of its big name Cabinet officials.  The White House PNTR “War Room” had
150 staff and was managed by a group of principals including Secretaries William Daley
(Commerce), Dan Glickman (Agriculture), Charlene Barshefsky (U.S. Trade Representative)
Madeline Albright (State), William Cohen (Defense), and Larry Summers (Treasury).  In
comparison, only two Cabinet members were fierce NAFTA lobbyists — Treasury Secretary
Lloyd Bentsen and U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor. 
Z White House Junket to China cost taxpayers more than $307,000 per round-
trip undecided seat.  Two planned 25-member Congressional delegations to China were
collapsed into one delegation with four Members when Congressional interest plummeted under
pressure from constituents outraged at the White House’s proposed propaganda tour. The cost
of the trip for taxpayers exceeded $614,000, and only two of the Members on the trip were
undecided, the other two were already committed PNTR supporters. The two undecided
Members voted for PNTR, at a taxpayer cost of $307,000 per vote.
Z Seemingly objective foreign policy experts pushed a PNTR policy that
benefitted their corporate clients.  The administration and China business recruited
several notable foreign policy experts to speak in favor of PNTR at highly publicized press
conferences.  Experts like Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell and Alexander Haig
endorsed PNTR at these events without disclosing extensive ties to companies who would
benefit from the measure.  Kissinger and Scowcroft have personally helped American
companies like Disney, American International Group, and Chubb open the Chinese market for
production and export, Haig and Powell both sit on the board of airplane manufacturer
Gulfstream which will benefit from the deal, and Powell is on the board of America Online, a
major PNTR proponent.
Z White House privatized congressional vote buying to corporations, thus
avoiding its bad reputation on pork barrel deals from NAFTA. The Clinton
administration cut deals, made compromises, and promised to fund pet Congressional projects
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to round up about a dozen last-minute votes in the last weeks before the vote.  However,
relative to the scores of such deals required to pass NAFTA, the government payments for
China PNTR votes were moderate, with corporate giving making up the difference.  The shift
reflected several phenomena: the administration’s terrible follow through on its NAFTA
promises meant most members did not trust the offered deals and this time around the
administration only had months, not years, to come through on the promises before the
conclusion on the second term.  One member was promised federal funding to refurbish an
aircraft manufacturing plant, another sought a new zip code and funding for pest eradication,
two Texas Members sought approval for re-opening an environmentally controversial oil
pipeline much of which is fifty years old, one Member received a commitment to maintain
funding for an obsolete weather station, a federal study of job losses due to imports was
requested by another Member, and the Clinton administration withdrew an appeal of a court
ruling to permit environmentalists to sit on trade advisory committees instead of just industry
representatives.
Conclusions
The overwhelming flow of monies to campaigns, congressional leadership and party fund-raisers,
lobbyists and advertisers polluted the free flow of ideas converting a crucial public policy debate on
U.S.-China relations into a commercial marketing venture.
 
Never at issue was strong U.S. public opposition to a policy that encouraged U.S. businesses to
relocate to China to take advantage of shameful labor and environmental conditions ensured by a
government whose growing human rights violations they agreed to ignore  The relative merits of
different U.S.-China policy approaches was never seriously considered by a Congress marinated  in
unprecedented torrents of money, swarmed by corporate lobbyists and revolving door government and
corporate players, stupified by endless paid PR and advertising repetition of the Big Lie message on
PNTR, and seduced by White House pressures and promises.
With American trade policy not being thoughtfully debated, but rather sold to the only bidder —
corporate special interests — the number of unemployed Congresspeople is as certain to rise as the
U.S.-China trade deficit.  
While corporate money can purchase power over the short term, in the longer term person-to-person
education and local political accountability cannot be overcome.  As with the fallout after NAFTA,
following PNTR, a new set of Representatives will learn about the perils of pursuing corporate
managed trade policy the hard way.
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PURCHASING POWER: THE CORPORATE-WHITE HOUSE
ALLIANCE  TO PASS THE CHINA TRADE BILL OVER THE WILL OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE 
Introduction
The passage of China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) by the U.S. House of
Representatives in late May 2000 over the overwhelming will of the American people was the result of
the most forceful and aggressive corporate legislative campaign in history.  Despite four-to-one public
opposition, the bill was passed by the use of unprecedented amounts of corporate money in political
contributions, advertising, lobbying and rented “experts,” as well as the application of the White
House’s full resources.  To fulfill their own overlapping goals, the corporate coalition and the White
House worked in such tight coordination that the General Accounting Office has reported that federal
law on Executive branch lobbying practices was violated.   Deaf to pleas from even pro-PNTR House1
Democrats, the administration launched the China PNTR crusade to build a legacy for the President
knowing it would damage Democrats’ chances to regain a House majority.  To celebrate the House
PNTR vote, President Clinton went out that night to a corporate political fund-raiser boycotted by
many Democratic House Leaders.   2
The corporate interest was in eliminating the annual Congressional review of China trade and to obtain
unconditional, unlimited access to the U.S. market for goods produced in China.  The day after the
House vote, the Wall Street Journal and other papers finally reported that the corporations were not
so much interested in access to the Chinese market to sell goods there, but rather sought guaranteed
U.S. access for goods they could produce in China with its remarkably high-quality, cheap,
government-controlled labor and lax environmental controls.  
Passing China PNTR was an important priority for both players for another important and symbolic
reason: the proponents of corporate globalization and corporate managed trade had been defeated for
five years by a determined citizen’s movement that recognized that the corporate and White House
globalization agenda was benefitting narrow corporate interests at the expense of working families and
the environment.  The Clinton administration and the corporate lobbies had pushed the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) which established the World Trade Organization (WTO) through the Congress during
the administration’s first term.  While the NAFTA and WTO fights required concerted corporate
lobbying and public relations efforts,  obtaining political support for expanding existing globalization
policies had become much more difficult.  Polling showed that people had become aware of the all-too-
real down sides of what its proponents dubbed “free trade,” but was increasingly revealed to be
corporate managed trade.3
Several years after NAFTA’s passage when its negative impacts became apparent, public opinion,
never supportive of the corporate-White House trade agenda, turned frosty.  Significant relocation of
2      Public Citizen, September 2000 ________________________________________
During the Senate debate allowing an
economic response to potential Chinese
proliferation in September, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce President Tom Donohue said if the
“politics of nuclear proliferation” stopped the bill
there would be “a very serious political
implication for those who were a party to that
action.”
high-wage manufacturing jobs to Mexico, increased border pollution and health problems, and the
declining safety of America’s increasingly imported food supply made the public increasingly skeptical
of the promises and projections made by the “free trade” proponents.  
But the corporate proponents greatly underestimated the breadth and depth of public opposition to their
trade agenda.  The citizen coalitions that
opposed NAFTA and WTO were gaining
additional policy expertise, becoming more
politically astute and organizing the growing
number of disaffected voters and working
families around the country.  Many House
supporters of NAFTA faced tough re-election
fights in 1994.  The Democrats lost control of
the House of Representatives when their
disillusioned base of labor and environmental
voters stayed home.
The residual anger over “free trade” votes from the first half of the 1990's still haunts some House
members.  After 10 terms in office, Rep. Matthew Martinez (D-CA) lost a 2000 primary challenge
organized by community leaders in his district disgusted by his trade vote record.   Other Democratic4
survivors of NAFTA, who faced years of ire for supporting NAFTA, opposed China PNTR (including
Reps. Bob Clement (TN), Sam Farr (CA), Bart Gordon (TN), Alcee Hastings (FL), Karen McCarthy
(MO), Carrie Meek (FL), Ed Pastor (AZ), and Lucille Roybal-Allard (CA)).5
Democrats who voted for China PNTR will face similar hurdles this November and in subsequent
elections.  The industrial unions have withdrawn or withheld financial and, more importantly, grassroots
support for pro-PNTR Members.  For instance, the United Auto Workers and the Teamsters have
withdrawn their endorsement of Rep. Sander Levin (D-MI) for his pivotal role in  providing political
cover to Democrats with an ineffective China PNTR amendment on human rights.   Unions have also6
withdrawn support for freshman Rep. Dennis Moore’s (D-KS) campaign because of his pro-PNTR
vote, even though Moore won in 1998 by a slim margin where labor was the measure of victory.   The7
Teamsters also withdrew support for Rep. Diana DeGette (D-CO), Rep. Lois Capps (D-CA), and
Rep. Tom Sawyer (D-OH).   Rep. Sawyer also faces the prospect of labor supporting his Republican8
opponent, Rick Wood who opposes China PNTR, or a primary challenge from progressive Democrats
in 2002.   A considerable list of unions have halted financial and grassroots support of other pro-PNTR9
voters. 
China PNTR Context: The Corporate Empire Must Strike Back
The White House and corporate lobbyists viewed the China PNTR battle in the context of having been
regularly defeated by under-funded public interest critics for the previous five years.  They had to win
the China PNTR skirmish simply to prove they were not vanquished.  Already, the U.S. public has
rejected the corporate public relations assertion that this version of corporate economic globalization
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 GATT was passed after the Congressional midterm elections of 1994 in a “lame-duck” session of*
Congress, where many Members voting in favor of the agreement had been defeated in recent elections or were
retiring, and hence, were unaccountable to voters.  Some of these departing members were seeking employment in
the private sector as lobbyists or consultants.
 Established in 1974, Fast Track delegated the exclusive Congressional constitutional authority over**
international commerce policy to the executive branch.  Fast Track delegated away four distinct Congressional
authorities to the Executive branch in one fell swoop, preserving for Congress only a “yes” or “no” vote on
completed trade agreements and thousands of pages of legislation to conform U.S. laws without amendment allowed
and limited debate.
was inevitable.  The admission of an exhausted U.S. Trade Representative Barshefsky that the Seattle
WTO round was dead was only the latest evidence.  
Despite a triumphant declaration at the 1995 Summit of the Americas that NAFTA would be expanded
to Chile, several years later NAFTA itself was under attack.  Two years after the controversial GATT
Uruguay Round passed in a lame duck session of Congress  and three years after the passage of*
NAFTA, President Clinton built up a special campaign to obtain new Fast Track  authority to expand**
NAFTA to other Latin American nations, particularly Chile.  A broad citizens’ coalition of
environmentalists, labor activists, consumer groups, family farmers and religious congregations
organized against the president’s proposal and a majority of Congress sided with their constituents in
1997 and again in 1998 and refused to allow Fast Track.
Starting in 1997, the President also pushed the African Growth and Opportunity Act and before that
the Carribean Basin NAFTA parity bill, but both measures were repeatedly halted by Congress,
including an overwhelming defeat of the Carribean Basin bill on the House floor in 1997.10
Also in 1997, another corporate globalization proposal was secretly fermenting.  The Multilateral
Agreement on Investment would provide extraordinary new protections for investors and investments
limiting national and local governments’ abilities to make business accountable to the needs of the
population.  Pushed by multinational corporate trade associations like the U.S. Council for International
Business, the secret text was leaked to Public Citizen, which posted the extreme proposal on the
internet.  An international coalition quickly rose to oppose the MAI, dubbed a global “NAFTA on
steroids” for its provisions empowering corporations to directly sue governments for cash compensation
for regulatory costs.  The MAI negotiations were terminated in late 1998 after hundreds of civil society
groups worldwide pressured their governments to withdraw from negotiations.
The international coalition of civil society groups that stopped the MAI shifted its campaign against
corporate economic globalization towards the upcoming World Trade Organization Ministerial
scheduled for late 1999 in Seattle.  Throughout the course of the year, consumer groups, labor activists,
environmentalists, animal welfare groups, religious congregations and family farmers in 30 countries
organized opposition to a planned “Millennium Round” expansion of the power and authority of the
WTO.  The U.S. coalition joined a year-long international “WTO: No New Round, Turnaround”
4      Public Citizen, September 2000 ________________________________________
 Throughout the report, the Business Week Harris poll from April 24  is referenced because it provides the* th
best insight into the opinions of the American public during the PNTR debate.  First, it was taken at the height of the
advertising and public relations campaign.  Second, polling research shows that opinions about trade agreements
varies based on the detail of the question, asked whether free-trade is good people usually say yes, but if asked
whether it should occur without consideration of the environment, labor and human rights people answer no.  A
longitudinal analysis of American attitudes towards China trade agreements like PNTR by University of Maryland’s
Program on International Policy Attitudes has found that since the early 1990's, public opposition to NTR/PNTR has
increased to become a steady majority since 1995. (See PIPA, Americans on Globalization, Appendix A: Americans
on U.S.-China Trade)
Former pro-NAFTA Congressman Dave McCurdy
who currently lobbies for the Electronic Industries
Alliance characterized the legislation as “the
biggest vote of the decade”
campaign which was supported by 1,448 civil society groups from 89 countries.   Fifty thousand critics11
of corporate managed trade and corporate economic globalization from across the world met in Seattle
in late November culminating the year-long campaign.  The summit talks collapsed when public
pressure and scrutiny in numerous countries made it politically impossible to negotiate the kind of WTO
expansion that big business had demanded. 
The corporate managed trade zealots in the White House, GOP congressional leadership, board
rooms, corporate-sponsored think tanks and editorial boards were aghast that ordinary citizens were
subverting the advancement of their prized agenda. This series of setbacks put the White House and big
business in a panic, with pundits and editorial page writers bemoaning the backlash against corporate
economic globalization.  Meanwhile, the so-called “Washington consensus” had been dealt more
serious blows by the International Monetary Fund-fueled Asian financial crisis and related economic
meltdowns in Brazil and Russia.  The importance of the China PNTR fight was greatly escalated
because of this context, with no expense seen as too great to politically beat this growing citizens’
movement.
Thus, the White House and big business lobby
launched a crusade to defend their mutual
corporate managed trade interests.  The
unprecedented nature and intensity of the fight
showed more than anything their recognition that
according to a Business Week/Harris poll public
opinion was 79% against the China deal despite
the strong economy, and that the critics that had caused that shift were more formidable than ever.  *
Learning the mistakes from their dismissive opinion of their opponents, the Clinton administration and
business interests adopted a cynical strategy: purchase a victory that could not be won on the merits. 
The legislative battle over China PNTR relived the NAFTA fight of seven years earlier, yet while the
tactics were the same, the growing power of the opposition required many times over the expenditures
made on the pro-NAFTA fight.  Buying up formidable lobbying and public relations savvy was only
part of a campaign which marinated the Congress in unprecedented millions in corporate cash.  The
Clinton administration used all of its political capital, enormous staff, public relations prowess, and
experience for the fight — unlike the Administration’s efforts on other alleged priorities such as
minimum wage, labor law reform, and patients bill of rights. 
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The Business Roundtable corporate
members made $4.2 million in soft
contributions in March 2000 alone,
almost double the donations in
February.  Total contributions from the
Business Roundtable members during
1999-2000 were 25% greater than 1997-
1998 when Fast Track was in play
With the corporate cash, paid “experts” and lobbyist legions, and corporate astroturf was much more
intense than during the NAFTA effort, the capture of PNTR was a largely “privatized” operation. 
Rather than a substantive policy making debate, the PNTR fight represented the very type of influence
peddling and money and power inside Washington that the American public rightly distrusts.  Like the
corporate funding of the Seattle WTO Ministerial, public functions and policies are being essentially
purchased by corporate interests with increasing frequency and funding.  While the NAFTA vote was
secured when major government pork barrel deals made the difference, in China PNTR the corporate
cash was king.
The corporate-White House campaign employed a “Big Lie” strategy successfully, using its paid ads,
paid “experts” and White House bully pulpit to endlessly repeat false information designed to create a
broadly acceptable arguments in favor of China PNTR, tacitly admitting that revealing the actual special
interest goals would not work.  Thus, the pro-PNTR machine repeated that  the U.S. would gain none
of the benefits of China’s entry into the WTO unless Congress passed PNTR.  This was patently false
and the Administration and business interests knew it.  The U.S. would receive all the tariff benefits and
market accesses of China’s potential WTO membership by simply maintaining annual NTR. As the
critics undercut this lie with the facts, the Administration was forced to admit that all of the WTO-
lowered tariffs would apply for U.S. farmers and firms even without PNTR.12
Thus, the second “Big Lie” was elevated in use: China PNTR would create an export utopia to send
American goods to the most populous nation.  But Chinese incomes are too paltry to afford U.S.
goods, lending credence to the critics contention that PNTR was not about exporting to Chinese
families but rather about employing them at low wages in U.S.-owned factories.  
Starting early, the corporate lobby burst into a cash-
lubricated high gear.  A well-funded television, radio
and print advertising campaign was deployed nationally
and locally — from national CNN spots to undecided
districts to Washington.  The corporate lobby spent
bundles to create the illusion of local based support for
PNTR by recruiting, training and then flying in local
political and business leaders to lobby in Washington,
organizing the same recruited team to visit members of
Congress at home armed with “local” glossy materials
prepared on Washington’s K Street corridor, and
assorted artificial grass roots lobbying (often referred
to as “astro-turf, ” as opposed to local grass-roots organizing) such as distributing on CD-ROM and
computer disk to retirees of pro-PNTR corporations pro-PNTR “sample” letters to Congress and to
the local newspaper editor, and scripts and toll-free numbers for calls to Congress accompanied by
letters emphasizing the importance of PNTR passage to the mailing recipients’ interests.  More typical
high-powered lobbying was employed as well, with an army of well-heeled, hired-gun lobbyists and
“experts” — including many former government employees and Members of Congress — from the
most prominent Washington firms.  This hired team supplemented visiting CEO with easy access to
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The Role of the Media in the Big Lie Strategy
Throughout the campaign leading up to the PNTR vote in the House, media coverage ignored the most
significant economic criticisms: that the legislation would not increase exports to China but would
increase the corporate investment of U.S. firms in China, the relocation of American manufacturing to
China, the failure of China to abide by its agreements and an increasing U.S. trade deficit with China.  
The day after the vote, Congress and the American public finally got to see the real news: stories
pushed by PNTR critics for months, but never covered. The Washington Post coverage stood out as
most biased, even as many national newspapers outdid the low water mark of locking out opposition
arguments, issues and events set on NAFTA and WTO coverage. But, the day after the vote in the
Washington Post, the truth finally started to get play. 
In  “Acceptance Doesn’t Mean Compliance,” for the first time the stampeded farm state legislators were
able to read: “But enforcement provisions in the WTO deal are so vague, and China’s promises to import
more American farm products must be reconciled with long-standing fears that China might become too
dependent on foreign countries for its food supply and with the already precarious economic
circumstances of China’s farmer.”  13
In the Post’s “Process May Take Years to Bear Fruit,” PNTR supporters suddenly could be viewed 
singing a very different song about how “Our headaches with China will now increase rather than
decrease” and “The Chinese are going to be very vexing trade partners.”14
Meanwhile, the second-place loser in the lopsided PNTR coverage award, the New York Times finally
revealed in one front page story nearly every locked-out argument made by PNTR critics over six
months time:  “It will be years before anyone knows if the economic roll of the dice behind today’s vote,
or the strategic one, will pay off.  On paper, the accord promises vast new openings for American
agricultural goods, telecommunications equipment and Internet providers, among others. But history
suggests that as soon as China’s tariffs come down, new bureaucratic barriers will magically appear....”
And, “China is already at work on ways to slow the promised influx of American competitors in its
market....”  And “There is little doubt that, once a member of the World Trade Organization, Beijing will
use its clout there to work against the international regulation of labor and environmental rights that Mr.
Clinton says are so necessary.”15
Even the more accurate and balanced coverage of the Wall Street Journal did not include -- until after the
vote -- a story revealing that while corporations pushing PNTR were selling the vote with arguments
about exports, what they really sought was security to invest in China and produce there. The Journal
story includes quotes of corporate PNTR players -- too late -- directly admitting that while lobbying about
U.S. exports to China, their goal was shifting investment to China.16
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Congressional offices.  This was all topped off with enormous campaign contributions to members of
Congress, their leadership political action committees and the parties’ political contribution funds.
Much of this effort was coordinated by the White House.  The White House built a command center to
oversee the legislative and public relations battle and rolled out a bigger version of the same tricks that
helped pass NAFTA — a mob of “experts” to endorse the proposal, shore up and protect allies in the
House of Representatives; the Bully Pulpit and Cabinet to advance the Big Lie message; and the use of
tight co-ordination with big business to ensure a united front. Indeed, the corporate-White House
operation to pass China PNTR was so entwined that the General Accounting Office found the White
House to be in violation of the prohibitions against Executive branch co-ordination with business to
promote grass-roots lobbying activities.17
PNTR was advocated by more and more prominent White House Cabinet Secretaries.  The White
House and Cabinet also operated a public relations machine which reached out to media outlets
through briefings, press conferences, targeted opinion pieces and talking directly to local reporters on
small newspapers and local TV news shows who often don’t get access to such high level politicos.  A
raft of “experts” were used to justify PNTR, and in some cases the same experts were trotted out
repeatedly with each restatement promoted and covered as a new news event because of the White
House bully pulpit.  In the last weeks before the vote, the President cemented votes by promising
special deals to provide political cover for undecided members.  However, given the much higher level
of corporate cash and effort relative to the NAFTA fight and the Administration’s bad reputation for
delivering on pork-barrel promises, this was a secondary tactic.  Largely, the effort to pass China was
privatized.
The overwhelming corporate expenditure on campaign contributions — purchased strategy and tactics
— worked, and the popular will of the overwhelming majority of Americans was subverted.  Although
a Harris/Business Week poll found that 79% of Americans opposed the PNTR deal without strong
protections for labor and human rights,  the House passed PNTR by a 60%-40% margin (237-197).  18 19
After five years of losses to the citizen movement that opposed “free” trade giveaways to big business,
the corporate-Clinton team replayed the NAFTA strategy fueled by significantly more money for
success with gusto.  The pro-PNTR campaign is the best case study of the corrosive effect money and
power can have on the legislative system.
The China PNTR Corporate Lobby 
Political Donations
The pro-PNTR corporate coalition was comprised of generous corporate donors who were prepared
to spend lavishly to ensure the success of the controversial trade measure.  Between January of 1999
and the House vote, the corporate members of the Business Roundtable made $68.2 in contributions to
candidates by PACs and individuals, helping to gain access and sway opinions of House Members.  In
addition, the same interests made soft money donations to the political parties, ensuring the focus of
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party leaders on both sides of the aisle.  This flood of money greatly exceeded what labor and other
opponents could offer, but also was great multiples of what was spent to push NAFTA.
The corporate members of the Business Roundtable, the business trade association leading the business
community’s charge for China PNTR, made $58 million in soft money, PAC and individual
contributions to parties and candidates between January of 1999 and May of 2000, according to the
Center for Responsive Politics.   The Business Roundtable corporate members made $4.2 million in20
soft contributions in March 2000 alone, almost double the donations in February.   Total contributions21
from the Business Roundtable members during 1999-2000 were 25% greater than 1997-1998 when
Fast Track was in play and 32% greater than in 1995-1996.  22
The business donations massively outstripped those of labor during the campaign.  The $58 million in
donations of the membership of just one business association, the Business Roundtable, overshadowed
those of all labor unions by nearly 2 to 1.  Unions gave $31 million in PAC, soft money and individual
contributions over the same period according to the Center for Responsive Politics.   Amplifying this23
trend, labor was outspent 11.5 to 1 by members of the Business Roundtable in soft money donations in
the month of May, when China PNTR came to its crucial vote in the House, with Business Roundtable
members giving $805,000 in soft money to labor unions’ $70,000.24
In addition, many members of the business
coalitions also ponied up handsome sums
to fund the Democratic and GOP
conventions, guaranteeing that the
platforms of the two major parties would
reflect the corporate managed trade
agenda.  Prominent members of the
Business Roundtable gave generously,
according to the Center for Responsive
Politics.  The corporate sponsors, who
picked up nearly $70 million of the $85
million tab for the two conventions, closely
mirror the members of the Business
Roundtable. In fact, 51% of the corporate
donors giving over $100,000 to the
conventions are BRT members.  These
large BRT donors to the conventions gave
a total of  $9.35 million by June 1, 2000 to both parties kick off galas — 67.3% of the total.  25
American International Group, a prominent insurer and BRT member, provided $2 million to the
Democrat convention and $500,000 to the GOP gala.  Microsoft, one of the high tech companies
pushing PNTR the hardest, gave $1 million each to the Democrat and Republican conventions. 
Telecommunications giant Motorola gave $1 million to support the GOP convention and aircraft
supplier and PNTR proponent Boeing gave $100,000 to the Democrat convention.26
GOP Pro PNTR (164 )
Ind Anti PNTR (2 )
GOP Anti PNTR (57 )
Dem Pro PNTR (73 )
Dem Anti PNTR (138 )
PNTR Vote, May 24, 2000
(237-197, 60%-40%)
9_________________________________________________________ Purchasing Power      
In comparison to the PNTR campaign contribution torrent, the campaign contributions made by
business interests in the legislative fights over health care reform and NAFTA seem modest.  The
Center for Public Integrity found that all health care interests made $25 million in political donations
between 1993 and the first quarter of 1994, or less than half what was spent by the membership of just
one trade association, the Business Roundtable.   The 35 key NAFTA proponents from the27
USA*NAFTA coalition made $3.8 million dollars in political donations between 1991 and 1992, while
NAFTA was being negotiated.  For comparison, the Business Roundtable has more than 200 similar28
corporate members to USA*NAFTA, if similar numbers of firms were projected, the pro-NAFTA
coalition would have only donated $22.8 million. 
Reverse PNTR Shakedown
The prospect of increased political funding came with a none-too-thinly veiled threat that Members of
Congress who voted against China PNTR would see their corporate campaign donations cut off. 
During a CEO fly-in lobbying blitz on Capitol Hill in early February, CEO of FMC Corp. Robert N.
Burt, a fierce advocate of PNTR, stated: “We aim our donations...at people who support free
enterprise and what we see as the free-enterprise system.  Free trade is certainly one element that goes
into that.”   Some industry lobbyists were even more direct about the link between a Member’s vote29
against PNTR and the receipt of corporate campaign money.  After Minority Leader Richard Gephardt
(D-MO) announced his opposition to PNTR, an unnamed high-tech industry lobbyist said to Roll Call
that Democratic anti-PNTR positions have repercussions and that “they better believe it’s going to hurt
them in terms of money in November.”   U.S. Chamber of Commerce President Thomas Donohue30
summed the impact a member’s China vote could have on fund raising this way:  “If somebody’s on the
margin and they screw up this vote, they’d better not look to me for money.”31
Conversely, PNTR supporters and undecided
Members used their position as an opportunity
to extract money from corporate donors.  New
corporate-funded PACs have been established
simply to create new sources of cash to
promote pro-corporate managed trade votes. 
For instance, the New Democratic Network
rolled out a series of fund raisers for pro-PNTR
Democrats hosted by 23 representatives of the
business community.  By the day of the vote,32
the NDN had raised $250,000 for 10 House
members from companies including AOL,
Motorola, Citigroup, and Boeing.   Undecided33
Rep. Max Sandlin (D-TX), struggling under a
large campaign debt, had a fund raiser hosted by the Emergency Committee for American Trade a
month before the vote.   Sandlin had been widely expected to vote against PNTR given his working34
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Undecided Rep. Max Sandlin (D-TX), struggling
under a large campaign debt, had a fund raiser
hosted by the Emergency Committee for
American Trade a month before the vote. 
Sandlin had been widely expected to vote
against PNTR given his working class district
and close labor ties, but he voted for it.
class district and close labor ties.  He voted for PNTR, telling a local labor union president the day of
the vote that he would support the bill if it looked like it would pass.35
Rep. Martin Frost (D-TX) phoned Motorola before he made his decision to vote for PNTR and asked
the company to sponsor a fund raiser for him.  Political magazine National Journal predicted that
Frost would be “accommodated, sooner rather than later.”36
The Republican party was more blatant, using scare tactics that raised the specter of Democratic
opposition to PNTR to generate funds for GOP candidates from the high-tech sector.  House
Republican campaign workers sent a mailing to the top executives at Internet, telecommunications and
computer companies arguing that Democratic obstructionism on PNTR would stifle profits with hopes
to raise millions of dollars in campaign donations.   The week before the vote, the Wexler Group, a37
well known Washington lobbying firm that played a major role in creating the pro-NAFTA astro-turf,
held a fund raiser for undecided Rep. Don Sherwood (R-PA).   Motorola hosted a similar event for38
undecided Rep. Patrick Toomey (R-PA) the week before the vote with 20 CEOs at the private Capitol
Hill Club.   These two representatives supported PNTR even though all the Pennsylvania Democrats39
and one of the Pennsylvania Republicans (William Goodling) opposed it.40
After the PNTR vote, several members revealed the pressure the business community exerted on them
in the forms of campaign contributions and promised future fund raisers.  Rep. Merrill Cook (R-UT)
was offered $200,000 in corporate campaign PAC money to change his vote from “no” to “yes,”
according to a Cook spokesperson.  41
The deluge of campaign contributions helped
the pro-PNTR forces in three essential, but
different ways.  First, the unlimited soft money
donations to the parties made the leadership
of both parties committed to delivering on this
vote.  GOP leaders worked very hard in the
House to keep their caucus strongly in favor
of the proposal, with Majority Whip Tom
DeLay, whose legislative strong-arm tactics
earned him the nickname ‘the hammer,’
working furiously to pass the bill.  Similarly,
the White House, which stands to obtain corporate soft money given to the party for presidential
campaign use, dedicated immense resources to pass the measure.  Second, the promise of campaign
contributions and the threat of reprisals kept undecided members on the fence longer and made some
more susceptible to the corporate position in the end.  Last, the slews of corporate donations provided
easier access to Members of Congress and their staff for the business lobbyists in comparison to
Chinese human rights activists and other PNTR opponents who frequently were unable to obtain
meetings.
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Sampling of Lobbying
Expenditures by PNTR
Proponents, Jan.-Jun. 2000
U.S. Chamber of Commerce $9.66 million      
Boeing $4.24 million
American Council of Life Insurers $3.7 million
Business Roundtable $2.94 million
Motorola $2.89 million
Microsoft $2.33 million (est.)
American International Group $1.7 million
American Farm Bureau $1.5 million
American Electronics Institute $1.5 million (est.)
Business Coal. US China Trade $240,000 (est.)
Caterpillar $220,000
Farmland $140,000
Living Large in Gucci Gulch: The Pro-PNTR Lobbying Behemoth
The corporate lobby pushing China PNTR has often been described in superlatives: it’s the biggest
lobby in history; it’s the most expensive lobbying and advertising campaign on a legislative issue ever;
there are more CEOs on Capitol Hill than ever before.  A glimpse at some of the details underlying the
conclusions reveal the amount of money required to buy these superlatives.  An analysis by Public
Citizen of some of the most ardent PNTR advocates found that just 12 corporations and trade
associations spent $31.1 million lobbying Congress in the first six months of 2000 and PNTR was the
focus of the lobbying efforts.
Farmers from all over the country were flown to Washington by the American Farm Bureau
Federation. Small business owners were flown to Washington by the Business Coalition for U.S. China
Trade. Individual CEOs flew in and out of Washington lobbying on behalf of the Business Roundtable
and for the Electronic Industries Alliance, which alone brought 30 CEO’s to Washington to meet with
Members in mid-March.   The week of the vote, the Business Coalition for U.S. China Trade42
delivered baskets with cell phones,
computer chips, Pepsi, and candles to 300
House Members.   Contending that the43
Chinese market for wireless
communications is likely to explode, the
telecommunications industry “lobbied
Capitol Hill on an unprecedented level,”
Grant Seiffert, vice president of the
Telecommunications Industry Association
stated to the industry magazine Wireless
Week in late May.44
The campaign orchestrated by the Business
Roundtable and the Chamber of
Commerce was planned to cost between
$12 and $15 million in special PNTR
lobbying and advertising in addition to these
organizations already hefty lobbying and
advertising budget.   The two groups had45
even asked former Treasury Secretary
Robert Rubin to be a celebrity fund raiser
for the special campaign, but he turned down the job, forcing the trade associations to rely on
corporate leadership including consideration of  vice presidential candidate and Haliburton CEO Dick
Cheney before he was nominated to the GOP ticket.   46
The $12-$15 million budget does not even take into account the expenditures of individual corporate
members of these coalitions or other trade associations such as the major expenditures of the National
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Sampling of Former
Congressional and White House
Staff Lobbying on PNTR
The American Council of Life Insurers (ACLI)
hired consultants from podesta.com, founded
by White House Chief of Staff John Podesta
The Chamber of Commerce retained Public
Strategies, the firm of former Clinton White
House Press Secretary Mike McCurry
ACLI’s lobbyist Jeff Richetti, brother of current
White House Deputy Chief of Staff Steven
Richetti, White House deputy on China PNTR
Motorola retained Nicholas Calio, the former
Assistant to President Bush on NAFTA
negotiations 
Former Senate Judiciary Counsel Marla
Grossman (Microsoft)
Former Chief of Staff for Majority Whip Tom
DeLay (R-TX), William Jarrell (Microsoft)
Former Assistant to Speaker of the House Newt
Gingrich (R-GA), Ed Kutler (Microsoft)
Former Chief of Staff for Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-
MD), Melissa Schulman (Business Roundtable)
Former House Republican Conference
Legislative Co-ordinator Brenda Reese
(Boeing)
Former Chief of Staff to Sen. Max Baucus (D-
MT), David Castagnetti (Boeing)
Association of Manufacturers, the Business
Coalition for U.S. China Trade, and American
Farm Bureau. In comparison, the entire pro-
NAFTA corporate coalition dedicated $10
million to the advocacy and advertising
campaign.47
Indeed, a Public Citizen examination of the
lobbying reports of some of the most prominent
companies and trade associations and their hired
retainers of the pro-PNTR proponents found
that these dozen groups from agriculture,
manufacturing, insurance and technology sectors
spent $31.1 lobbying Congress in the first half of
2000 and more than $90 million since January of
1999.  Because of the limited availability of
timely data from federal lobbying disclosure
 requirements which were filed August 15  butth
are only just becoming available in mid-
September, this represents only a small snapshot
of the lobbying powerhouses pushing PNTR
meaning the final expenditures will be larger than
those Public Citizen could verify.   Since some48
of the most ardent PNTR corporate supporters’
lobbying is examined in this report, this sampling
is underscored by the wide array of other
anecdotal evidence. Press quotes from
corporate sources and op-eds in newspapers,
press accounts of lobbying activity in
Washington and across the country, as well as
the size of the prominent advertising campaign
show that this figure represents just the tip of the
iceberg.
The corporate coalition waged an internal
campaign to raise PNTR campaign funds with
declarations revealing the importance winning on
China PNTR to the business lobby.  Former
pro-NAFTA Congressman Dave McCurdy who
currently lobbies for the Electronic Industries
Alliance characterized the legislation as “the
biggest vote of the decade.”   Bank of America called PNTR “historic legislation.”   Earnest49 50
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Davenport, CEO of Eastman Chemical said “It’s the most important trade vote we’re going to have for
10 years.”   ExxonMobil described the PNTR vote as “one of the most important policy decisions51
faced by the Congress of the United States,” in a New York Times advertisement.   A Chamber of52
Commerce publication described the PNTR vote as “the most important trade vote in decades,”  and53
its China lobbyist called the vote the Chamber’s “top legislative priority.”   The Business Software54
Alliance President Robert Holeyman described the PNTR fight as “a key vote for the high tech
industry.”   The U.S. High Tech Industry Coalition for China sent Congress a letter that stated that55
PNTR “is critical to continuing American technological leadership and competitiveness.”   Hewlett-56
Packard President and CEO Carly Fiorina declared in a Los Angeles Times op-ed: “In reality, a vote
against trade with China is a vote against U.S. businesses....”  57
After an intensified annual China NTR fight in the spring and summer, by December 1999, the China
business lobby was gearing up for a major Congressional fight over PNTR.  The corporate lobby took
a page out of their opponents’ play book by starting early and focusing on targeted Members of
Congress with meetings inside the beltway and also meeting in districts, but in addition the corporate
lobby supplemented these efforts with plenty of cash.  For instance, the Business Roundtable had
targeted 71 House members and the Chamber targeted 66 by late 1999.   Several local political and58
business leaders were recruited and trained — with Washington lobbyists and corporate CEOs often
flown in as supplements — to conduct “local” meetings in Congressional districts aimed at blunting the
effect of the broad local anti-PNTR coalitions.  Personal communications to members of Congress from
industry heavy hitters included Richard McGinn, Chairman of Lucent and Irwing Jacobs, Qualcomm
Chairman.   In early May, 15 high-technology executives visited Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ) including59
Sony, Corning and 3M.60
The lobbying filings required under federal law for the first half of 2000 will only be completely available
by late September.  Thus in calculating corporate lobbying on PNTR, we rely on the key players’ 1999
NTR filings, the available 2000 filings and the corporate lobby’s public statements about additional
China PNTR specific campaign expenses. In general, disclosed lobbying expenditures have been rising,
FECInfo found that lobbying expenditures over the last six months of 1999 were about $772 million,
$75 million more than the first half of that year.        61
Business Trade Associations: China trade issues have long been the focus of the large
corporate trade associations.  The annual China trade status debates too frequently brought to light
human rights and weapons proliferation issues and unpleasant and unpopular business practices in
China.  The elimination of this annual public relations nightmare was a primary concern of the groups
representing companies doing business in China.  If unconditional, unlimited access could be locked in
for goods made in China, companies could shift more production and investment there without worrying
about a future U.S. public upset about human rights in China or job losses at home.
C U.S. Chamber of Commerce: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is one of the most
aggressive lobbying operations in Washington.  In the first half of 2000, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce spent $9.66 million — more than half the $18.16 million it spent all year in 1999.  62
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In 1999 before staffing up for the extra PNTR China effort, the Chamber employed a stable of
53 lobbyists, working on a variety of issues — from bankruptcy reform to defense authorization
to the tax code to Medicare reform to Y2K.  In 1999, the Chamber lobbied on several
international trade issues (Vietnam NTR, GSP, the Steel Enforcement Act, Cuba, Carribean
Basin Initiative, the Africa trade bill, and others). However, according to its 1999 lobbying
report, three of the Chamber of Commerce’s lobbyists were solely dedicated to work on China
NTR in the first half of 1999.  In the second half of 1999, the same three lobbyists worked on
China NTR (but also on OPIC authorization) and were joined by an additional four lobbyists
working on China WTO accession — more than doubling the Chamber’s representation on
Capitol Hill.   In 2000, however, the Chamber dedicated significantly more lobbying clout to63
China PNTR than it had to the annual NTR fights.  More than half of the Chamber’s 45
lobbyists were registered as lobbying on PNTR during the first half of 2000 (25 of 45
registered lobbyists).   64
Despite the size of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s in-house lobbying staff, it retains outside
lobbying firms.  In 1999, it  retained five outside firms to lobby Congress; in the first half of
2000, the only Chamber-hired firm whose reports were available by September 7  was theth
former firm of former Commerce Secretary Daley and current firm of former U.S. Trade
Representative Kantor, Mayer, Brown & Platt. That firm registered to lobby for the Chamber
on the amorphous “various issues, including but not limited to preemption and federalism.”   65
Two of the five firms retained by the U.S. Chamber in 1999, Public Strategies Washington and
Mayer, Brown & Platt, were specifically hired to lobby for the Chamber on trade issues.  66
Public Strategies Washington is part of the Public Strategies Group, led by former Clinton
White House Press Secretary Michael McCurry.  In a case of extreme revolving door between
corporate lobbyist and government official, the firm was also the former employer of the deputy
director of the White House’s China PNTR operation Steven Richetti (see below).   One of67
the Chamber’s lobbyists at Public Strategies Washington is Joe O’Neill who helped orchestrate
the lobbying campaign to pass NAFTA and is the son of former Democratic House Speaker
Rep. Tip O’Neill.   The Chamber’s other previous trade lobbying hire was Mayer, Brown &68
Platt, the former law firm of Commerce Secretary William Daley who was also tagged by
President Clinton to lead the PNTR fight.   The firm is also lobbying for a coalition of high tech69
firms organized by America Online and includes AT&T, Microsoft and Motorola.70
C Business Roundtable: The Business Roundtable was one of the primary coordinators
and directors of the pro-PNTR campaign.  It provided materials for “local” campaigns,
produced and placed television, radio and print advertisements, and helped to generate the
appearance of broad based support for PNTR.  It also presented a formidable lobbying
presence on Capitol Hill.  In the first half of 2000, the BRT spent $2.94 million lobbying
Congress, with more lobbyists on PNTR than any other issues, nearly twice as many (5) as the
next most important issue, health care (3).   In 1999, the BRT spent $8.3 million lobbying71
Congress, with more lobbyists working on China PNTR than any other issues.72
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The BRT retained an enormous stable of hired guns to push for PNTR in 1999.  It hired 7 firms
for a total of $1.06 million which detailed 27 lobbyists to China trade issues during 1999.   The73
group included many notables: Ken Duberstein, former President Reagan Chief of Staff;
Nicholas Calio, one of President Bush’s NAFTA negotiators; former Rep. Mike Kopetski (D-
OR); Bergner Bockorny lobbyists for the Business Roundtable included revolving door Hill
staffers such as the former House Republican Conference Legislative Coordinator Brenda
Reese, former Chief of Staff to Senator Max Baucus David Castagnetti and Melissa Schulman,
former Chief of Staff for Rep. Steny Hoyer (D-MD).
C Business Coalition for U.S. China Trade: The Business Coalition for U.S. China
Trade is a corporate group whose primary aim has been the elimination of the annual NTR
votes.  In a supplementary letter to its 1999 year-end lobbing report, it discloses that it spent
$240,000 to “support China’s WTO accession and the extension of PNTR status to China” but
that it “...does not employ any...lobbyists” under the disclosure law, and that it would be the
final filing.   It does however hire firms to represent it before Congress.  In 1999, it paid74
$80,000 to Hogan & Hartson for four lobbyists on PNTR.   For the first half of 2000, Hogan75
& Hartson was paid $120,000 for 5 PNTR lobbyists, a 50% increase over the previous filing’s
fees and with an additional lobbyist.   Importantly, more firms may have been retained by the76
Business Coalition, but their filings may not yet be available from the House Clerk’s Office. 
Even if the Business Coalition for U.S. China Trade spent the same amount lobbying during the
first half of 2000 when PNTR was at stake, it would have spent $240,000.
Insurance:  The insurance and financial industries are old hands on Capitol Hill, known for
expertise on arcana like tax and regulatory issues and big lobbying muscle on health care and banking
issues, but typically did not work much on trade issues.  But China represented an opportunity that
made insurers salivate — a billion life insurance policies worth even $1,000 dollars represented one
trillion dollars in assets.  The industries’ lobbying efforts were brought to bear on China PNTR like
fresh reinforcements to the traditional corporate trade lobby, according to American Council of Life
Insurers vice-president for federal affairs Phil Anderson, saying in early-May that the “insurance
industry is like a fresh team of horses.”77
C The American International Group:  The American International Group, one of the
world’s oldest insurance companies, has significant  interests in China. In 1992, AIG was the
first foreign insurer to enter China since the Chinese revolution.   The first half of 2000, AIG78
spent $1.7 million lobbying Congress, including on many trade issues, but 8 of its in-house
lobbyists worked on PNTR, more than twice as many as on any other issue.  It also retained79
the firm of Levine & Co. for $60,000 to work on PNTR.   In 1999, AIG spent $4.1 million80
lobbying Congress — on domestic insurance regulatory issues, but also on a wide range of
international insurance and trade issues, especially China.  During 1999, slightly more than three
quarters of AIG’s in house lobbyists worked on international issues, with more lobbyists
covering China than any other country.  AIG had three lobbyists working on transformational
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financial modernization legislation (which allows insurance-banking mergers for the first time in
nearly 50 years), but 9 working on China NTR and China insurance issues.81
Before escalating its efforts for PNTR, AIG also retained six additional firms to lobby Congress
on its behalf, all of whom worked on trade issues.  Two of those firms, Valanzano &
Associates and Fontheim Partners, worked on China NTR and a third, R. Duffy Wall &
Associates, Inc., provided “legislative intelligence” according to its lobbying report.82
C The American Council of Life Insurers:   During the first half of 2000, the American
Council of Life Insurers (ACLI) spent $3.7 million lobbying Congress, including spending on
China PNTR as prominently as on some insurance issues.  This mid-year report totaled more
than half the $6.6 million it spent on lobbying in 1999, when it also lobbied on China trade
status.   ACLI had three lobbyists working on China NTR in 1999, but it also worked on a83
number of other financial, insurance, health care, and retirement issues.  Two of the hired gun
lobbyists of ACLI either provided support on the China NTR fight or were deeply connected
to the Clinton administration.  Valanzano & Associates provided lobbying talent for ACLI on
China throughout 1999, much as it did for AIG.   More interesting is ACLI’s retention of84
podesta.com, founded by White House Chief of Staff John Podesta.   The podesta.com
lobbyist that handles the ACLI account is Jeff Richetti, brother of Steven Richetti, the deputy
director of the White House’s campaign to pass China PNTR.   ACLI also had hired as its85
president former South Carolina Representative and Governor Carroll Campbell, who was able
to use his connections to work Congress on China PNTR.  86
High Technology: Although trade associations and particular businesses have been invested in
trade fights for years, especially in the China debate on Capitol Hill, the technology firms were new
players in the corporate managed trade debate.  Computer firms looked for new, cheaper sources of
labor than in other east Asian countries.  Telecommunications companies sought the same
manufacturing edge, while claiming to be trying to capture an enormous and untapped consumer
market.  Though these companies were not big players in annual NTR, they brought new forces to bear
on PNTR.
C American Electronics Institute (AEI): The American Electronics Institute lobbying
report for the first half of 2000 was not available as of September 15 , but in 1999, theth
American Electronics Institute spent $3 million lobbying Congress — $1 million the first six
months and $2 million the second, when NTR was before Congress.  AEI lobbied on 13 issues
in 1999, and China trade was amongst the most important disclosed on the trade association’s
lobbying reports, despite the many relevant issues facing the electronics industry.  During the
first six months, AEI had six lobbyists working on trade issues, primarily China NTR and China
WTO accession, which was about the same as AEI had on all the other issues.  In the second
half of the year, AEI still had six lobbyists working on China trade issues, but it only had 4 on
Y2K issues, 4 on science issues, 4 on technology issues, and 2 on patent extension issues.  87
Even if AEI did not increase its lobbying the first half of 2000 because of PNTR, it would have
spent an estimated $1.5 million.
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Facts About Motorola and China PNTR
Motorola Political Donations Jan. 1999-April 2000: $274,274
Motorola pro PNTR advertising expenditures: $1 million
Investments in China manufacturing: $3.4 billion
Motorola rank as foreign investor in China: 1
Motorola domestic layoffs since 1998: 24,000 — 16%
(sources: Center for Responsive Politics; New York Times May 23, 2000; Los
Angeles. Times Sep. 2, 2000; Chicago Tribune Sep. 16, 1999)
C Motorola:  In the first half of 2000, Motorola spent $2.89 million lobbying Congress,
substantially more than reported for either half 1999.   If Motorola’s half-year 2000 lobbying88
expenditures continued, the total will be 37% higher than in 1999.  Motorola’s 2000 lobbying
had a decided focus on PNTR: it had 15 registered lobbyists working on PNTR, and only 11
on technology issues, the corporation’s next closest focus. Federal lobbying reports show
Motorola spent $4.21 million lobbying Congress in 1999, with a heavy focus on trade issues
including China NTR.  The first half of the year, Motorola spent $2.08 million lobbying
Congress and had more lobbyists working on trade (12) than on any other issue including
technology (9); China NTR
was listed as the second of
13 trade issues Motorola
worked on through mid-year
1999.  The second half of
1999, while China NTR was
active, Motorola spent $2.12
million on lobbying, fielded
more lobbyists on trade (14)
than it did the previous six
months on trade and more
than any issue for that period
including technology (10).89
Supplementing Motorola’s in-house lobbying team on China NTR was the firm of O’Brien
Calio, which received $120,000 from Motorola in 1999.  Seven O’Brien Calio lobbyists
worked almost exclusively on China NTR and China trade issues for Motorola, and one of
those lobbyists, Nicholas E. Calio is the former Assistant to President Bush on NAFTA
negotiations.  90
C Microsoft:  As of September 15 , Microsoft’s lobby report was not available from the Clerkth
of the House of Representatives, but many of its hired lobbying guns had filed their lobbying
reports, making it possible to track some of their employers lobbying activity.  The majority of
these outside firms lobbied on PNTR, trade or intellectual property issues, according to their
filings.  Five firms received a total of $1.02 million to lobby for Microsoft on PNTR and other
trade issues the first half of 2000.   Verner Liipfert received $160,000 from Microsoft for 1291
lobbyists to represent the firm on international software piracy (China business software piracy
rate was 95% in 1998 ) and trade relations with China — including former Senate Judiciary92
Committee Counsel Marla P. Grossman and former staffer to Congressman Frank Pallone (D-
NJ), Kapil Sharma .   Microsoft paid $300,000 to Barbour Griffith & Rogers, founded by93
former RNC Chairman Haley Barbour, to lobby on three issues including PNTR — Barbour
and three others represented Microsoft on PNTR.   Covington & Burling was paid $200,00094
to lobby on trade issues, including WTO issues.   Clark & Weinstock was paid $ 280,000 to95
have 6 lobbyists work on PNTR for Microsoft — including former Reps. Vin Weber (D-MN)
and Vic Fazio (D-CA) and Ed Kutler, former assistant to House Speaker Newt Gingrich.  96
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Microsoft paid the Downey McGrath Group, founded by former Rep. Tom Downey (D-NY), 
$80,000 to lobby on issues like intellectual property.   Intellectual property issues were key to97
the “market access” elements the U.S. allegedly received in the U.S.-China bilateral in
November of 1999.98
In 1999, Microsoft spent $4.66 million lobbying Congress.  In the first half of the year, 3 of
Microsoft’s 11 registered in-house lobbyists worked on China annual NTR — the year Y2K
liability, computer encryption, and e-commerce bills were before Congress.  The second half of
1999, Microsoft fielded 6 of its in-house lobbyists on China NTR, more than all its six other
issues except taxes and Y2K liability and the same as on labor issues.   In addition to99
Microsoft’s in-house lobbyists, it hired the well-connected lobbying shops of Verner, Liipfert;
Preston Gates Ellis & Rouvelas Meeds; and Clark & Weinstock to lobby on trade issues. 
Microsoft paid $80,000 to Verner Liipfert the second half of 1999 to lobby on nothing but
international software piracy and China trade relations.  This retainer covered 7 lobbyists,
including the well-connected former Senate Judiciary Committee Counsel Marla P.
Grossman.   In the first half of 1999, two of the Preston Gates lobbyists worked on China100
NTR, including the former Deputy Chief of Staff to Rep. Tom DeLay.  In the second half of
1999, 3 lobbyists represented Microsoft on China NTR from the Preston Gates firm.   The101
first half of 1999, Clark & Weinstock had 7 lobbyists working for Microsoft on trade issues
including NTR.  The firm received $220,000 to field an equal number of lobbyists on every
issue with lobbyists including such notables as former Rep. Vic Fazio (D-CA) (who only
lobbied the executive branch in 1999), former Representative Vin Weber (D-MN), former
Clinton Administration Assistant Secretary of Defense Sandi Stuart, and former Assistant to
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, Ed Kutler.102
Agriculture: Groups representing only small farmers, such as the National Farmers Union and the
National Family Farm Coalition, opposed PNTR, but agribusiness made PNTR passage a priority for
several reasons.  First, groups like the American Farm Bureau Federation include huge seed, chemical
and implement manufacturers whose interests are quite contrary to those of small farmers and ranchers
on many issues, causing local and state Farm Bureaus to take different positions on some trade issues
than the well-funded national office, which also is itself in the insurance business.  Second, failed U.S.
domestic farm policies, such as the disastrous “Freedom to Farm” Act have damaged so many
producers, those who pushed these policies are now desperately trying to shift the debate to expanding
export markets and away from domestic failures. Many farmers did not learn that China was a net
exporter of numerous commodities until after the vote.
C American Farm Bureau Federation: The American Farm Bureau is one of the most
powerful agribusiness trade associations in the country, which claims to represent family farmers
but which is dominated by other has more vested interests in insurance, feed processing and
agri-chemicals like fertilizers and pesticides, according to a recent Defenders of Wildlife
study.  In the first half of 2000, AFBF spent $1.5 million lobbying and trade was one of the103
dozens of issues AFBF worked on Capitol Hill, including PNTR and other sanctions bills;
during 1999 it spent $4.5 million including China trade issues.104
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Farmland printed pro-PNTR
messages on employees’ pay
checks such as “More than 30% of
this paycheck depends of
Farmland’s ability to do international
business.  Farmland’s owners and
employees win with trade.”
Facts about Boeing and China PNTR
Boeing Political Donations Jan. 1999-April 2000: $857,893
Sales to China 1997-1999: $4 billion
Boeing China jetliner market share: 67%
The four largest Chinese aircraft factories produce Boeing
parts and equipment
(sources: Center for Responsive Politics, Boeing 1999 annual report and
corporate material “The Boeing Company & China” )
C Farmland: Farmland Industries, an agribusiness company which produces grains, pork, cattle
and fertilizers  has actively lobbied on trade, especially China and trade embargo-related trade105
issues. Farmland spent $140,000 the first half of 2000 and $290,000 in 1999, according to its
lobby disclosure.  Its lobbying report shows it lobbied on PNTR in 2000 (25% of its disclosed
issues were trade, and PNTR was the first issue filed) and it even disclosed lobbying on PNTR
during the second half of 1999.   Farmland’s106
primary lobbyist is another member of the
revolving lobbyist-public servants; P. Scott
Shearer is the former Clinton Administration 
Deputy Assistant Agriculture Secretary.   One of107
the firms retained to lobby for Farmland was the
well connected firm of Patton Boggs which
received $45,000 from Farmland to lobby on
unspecified trade legislation focusing solely on
trade embargos.108
Manufacturing: Manufacturing firms advocated for
PNTR to obtain unconditional, unlimited, permanent access to U.S. consumer market for products
made in China. PNTR means manufacturers can relocate production to take advantage of China’s
remarkably low wages (often below $1 a day) and non-existent worker safety and environmental
regulations with confidence that outrageous conduct on human rights or weapons proliferation will not
result in the U.S. Congress pressuring the Chinese regime with trade sanctions which could cut into
corporate profit margins. As well, independent labor unions are forbidden in China, with organizers
sentenced to lengthy jail terms.
C Boeing: In 2000, Boeing spent $4.24 million lobbying Congress during the first half of the
year with 6 lobbyists working on PNTR, more than any other issue except defense that Boeing
lobbied Congress on— but more than budget, aerospace and aviation.   During the first half of109
2000, Boeing paid at least three firms at least $120,000 to lobby on PNTR, as of the
disclosure of firms available by September 7 , though that number is sure to rise withth
information available in later filings, since Boeing hired at least 18 firms to lobby on its behalf in
1999 (below).   Denny Miller Associates received $80,000 for 6 PNTR lobbyists, more than110
any other issue the firm lobbied
on for Boeing.   Shaw Pittman111
received $20,000 to lobby on
PNTR for Boeing.   Downey112
McGrath received $20,000 to
lobby on PNTR for Boeing and
2 other issues, and former Rep.
Ray McGrath (R-NY) lobbied
on PNTR for Boeing.   113
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In 1999, Boeing spent $8.2 million lobbying Congress, and its numbers of in house lobbyists on
China trade issues exceeded all other issues but defense.   In 1999, Boeing spent at least114
$1.74 million on 17 outside lobbying firms to represent its interests before Congress.  The
majority of these firms worked primarily on budget, aerospace, and defense bills, but four of the
firms and $380,000 dollars (about 22%) of the total spent on outside lobbyists went to
lobbyists working on trade, primarily China NTR.   Boeing paid $160,00 for nine lobbyists115
from the Washington Group who worked on three issues, one of which was NTR.   Denny116
Miller Associates received $140,000 from Boeing in 1999 to work on four issues, NTR and
aerospace had four lobbyists while aviation and defense had five.   Bergner-Bockorny117
received $60,000 from Boeing to field 7 lobbyists on NTR and other trade issues, including
revolving door Hill staffers such as the former House Republican Conference Legislative
Coordinator, Brenda Reese, and former Chief of Staff to Senator Max Baucus, David
Castagnetti.   The second half of 1999, Boeing also retained Downey McGrath Group for118
$20,000 to work solely on NTR.   While Boeing CEO Gary Condit heads the Business119
Roundtable’s trade task force.  Boeing built 70% of the commercial planes now in use in China
were built by Boeing and the company expects to sell 1,600 aircraft to China over the next two
decades, although technology transfer requirements and contract terms have required Boeing to
shift some of its production to China.120
C Caterpillar:  Caterpillar spent $220,000 lobbying Congress in the first half of 2000, more
than either half-year period in 1999.   During the first half of 2000, Caterpillar focused on121
PNTR.  In 1999, Caterpillar spent $380,000 lobbying Congress, working on PNTR and NTR
throughout the year, and during the second half of 1999 having the same number of lobbyists
working on PNTR as its other top two legislative priorities (health care and electricity), and
twice as many than on any other issue.
By the week of the vote the business lobby, working at a fever pitch and with limitless resources, had
simply bought overwhelming mercenary troops. The day of the vote, the Chamber of Commerce alone
dedicated at least one lobbyist for each undecided House member, fielding at least 50 lobbyists to
cover the legislators the Associated Press reported as still undecided on the morning of the vote.   The122
Business Roundtable hired hundreds of young temporary workers in D.C. to wear pro-PNTR t-shirts
and hand out free telephone calling cards at Metro stations and all around the Capitol and to appear at
“spontaneous” rallies in support of pro-PNTR Congresspeople.123
Even though numerous unions, human rights, environmental and other citizens’ groups made the China
PNTR fight a priority, their total unified Washington lobbying capacity started out smaller and
significantly less well-financed than the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s regular lobbying staff and was
further handicapped by the inability to buy mercenary lobbyists.  For instance, the AFL-CIO spent
$2.4 million in all of 1999 — 8% of what the list of key organizations that Public Citizen examined
supporting PNTR spent in the first half of 2000.   Only one of the AFL-CIO lobbyists focuses solely124
on trade issues.  The lobbying operations of major unions typically include between five and ten
lobbyists, only some work on trade.  Citizens Trade Campaign, Public Citizen, Friends of the Earth, the
Humane Society of the U.S., the National Family Farm Coalition, the Sierra Club, the Campaign for a
Free Tibet, and the Methodist Church each had one lobbyist working on PNTR, with some lobby visits
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also conducted by organization heads.  Typically, a more modest imbalance in D.C. lobbying resources
is overcome by the citizens’ groups unique pressure at home in the Congressional districts where their
members live. With nearly 80% of the public opposed to PNTR for China, the corporate lobby could
not hope to honestly overcome the grassroots advantage.  So, instead it once again bought an answer
— an expensive roll-out of astro-turf.
Corporate Astro-turf Rolls Over Grass Roots Opposition
The business trade associations orchestrated assorted ploys to create the sense that there were 
proponents of China PNTR located within Congressional districts rather than only in far-away
corporate board rooms and on Washington’s K Street corridor.  Of course, some local business
lobbying was real.  For example, the Rocky Mountain News, Colorado’s second largest paper, was
visited by what the paper called a “loosely knit group” of pro-PNTR business representatives including
Denver-Hainen Group, Coors Brewing and the Colorado Farm Bureau to make the case for PNTR.  125
However, the lion’s share of allegedly “local” pro-PNTR sentiment was generated by specialized
“astroturf” firms and buckets of cash.  The basic pro-PNTR astro-turf operation would  recruit a few
local business people to serve as the face of local PNTR support, then provide them with talking points
and “local” materials, and make appointments for them and link them with the closest Fortune 500
CEOs to create the illusion of local support.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce developed a program to foster this fabrication called “TradeRoots
China.”  Its goals, as espoused in the Chamber of Commerce’s monthly newsletter China Insider, are
to provide local facts and figures, work with governors, and publicize local China trade stories.   The126
“TradeRoots” program included a phone-banking operation that contacted 40,000 business activists to
generate calls to Congress on the U.S. Chamber’s toll-free “Legislative Hotline” and brought recruits
from 22 states to be trained and briefed in Washington.   Like a corporate lobbying Kabuki dance, this127
effort involved assigning major pro-PNTR corporations to lead the effort in a particular state by
recruiting, and then strategically using as “faces” a few local business people for local lobbying and
press activities.
Through this system, and by ordering local Chamber of Commerce staff to move the China PNTR
program in the name of their local communities regardless of local business peoples’ positions, over
100 Members of Congress were visited at home during the Easter Congressional recess.   In 2000,128
the Business Roundtable obtained meetings with 50 members of the House by identifying and  bringing
in to Washington pro-PNTR individuals from the Members’ districts “to show there is an impact on
even the smallest of companies,” a BRT spokesman reported to Congress Daily.   To conduct such129
an operation is an amazingly expensive and time-consuming undertaking requiring local staffing,
localized materials being produced and distributed, and the payments of local participants’ travel and
expenses.  While this investment of resources does not accomplish local education or change local
opinion, when done well, it created the appearance of local pro-PNTR counter-force to the real,
natural anti-PNTR coalitions existing across the country.  
In addition, the China PNTR issue was added to pre-existing local business activities by request of
national organizations.  For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce added the China issue to a large
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Sampling of China PNTR Revolving Door
Tornado: Ex-Members of Congress, former
Administration Officials, Ex-Party Officials
Former Rep. Michael Kopetski (D-OR, Business Roundtable)
Former Rep. Dave McCurdy (D-OK, Electronic Industries
Association)
Former Rep. and former governor Carroll Campbell (R-SC,
American Council of Life Insurers)
Former Rep. Vic Fazio (D-CA, Microsoft)
Former Rep Vin Webber (D-MN, Microsoft)
Former Rep. Ray McGrath (R-NY, Boeing)
Former Clinton U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor
(Aetna, America Online, Boeing and Citigroup)
Former Republican National Committee Chairman Haley
Barbour (Microsoft)
Former Clinton Administration Assistant Secretary of Defense
Sandi Stuart (Microsoft)
Former Clinton Administration Deputy Assistant Agriculture
Secretary P. Scott Shearer (Farmland)
meeting of local business leaders scheduled in Gainesville, Florida.  The PNTR issue was added to a
long-scheduled  local event which included about 800 local business leaders. It was intended to
influence Rep. Corrine Brown (D-FL) and Rep. Tillie Fowler (R-FL), who were both invited.  The
well-attended event was spun by the national Chamber as a “local” PNTR event although it turned out
to be the regular annual regional meeting.  The national Chamber arranged to have a national reporter
attend and cover it as a PNTR event for the New York Times.   Similarly, a regular annual Los130
Angeles Chamber of Commerce trip to Washington was billed as a local effort to help the President
pass PNTR.   Of course, these events were merely long planned local Chamber meetings, with China131
PNTR pasted in for press purposes.
Corporate PNTR proponents were
also desperate to show not only that
business interests supported China
PNTR, but also to create the
impression that ordinary people
supported the proposal.  Given the
strong public opposition, the
impression of a base of support could
only be generated by the unique
position of authority and even
intimidation that the corporate
proponents had with their workers and
their contractors.  Workers were
encouraged to support PNTR with
calls and letters through inserts in their
mailboxes and printed messages on
their paychecks.  These efforts were
estimated to have reached hundreds of
thousands of workers.   For instance,132
even as the national union representing
Boeing workers opposed PNTR
(noting that Boeing was shifting
production to China), Boeing sent
email to 30,000 employees asking
them to call or write their Members of
Congress.  Boeing also contacted an
additional 10,000 subcontractors and
suppliers urging them to pressure their
Congressional representatives.  133
Kansas City-based Farmland printed
pro-PNTR messages on employees’
pay checks such as “More than 30%
of this paycheck depends of
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Rep. Merrill Cook (R-UT) was offered
$200,000 in corporate campaign PAC
money to change his vote from “no” to
“yes,” according to a Cook
spokesperson.
Farmland’s ability to do international business.  Farmland’s owners and employees win with trade.”   134
The telecommunications industry also pitched in on the astro-turf lobbying including letter writing
campaigns by the employees the could convince had joint interests with the management — engineers,
managers and vendors of telecommunications contracts.   The well-heeled national American Farm135
Bureau brought growers into Washington every week to meet with Members of Congress and planned
to meet with every Member of the House either in the district or in Washington.   The American136
Electronics Association established a web-based campaign designed to help the members of American
Electronics Association to get their employees to become lobbyists for China PNTR.137
In April, the Business Coalition for U.S. China
Trade, a single issue business group focused
only on U.S.-China trade relations, bused and
flew “workers” to Washington to lobby in
favor of PNTR.  The group announced a
“lobby day” of thousands of pro-PNTR
workers aiming to counter the 20,000 union
workers coming to an anti-PNTR lobby day
the following week.  An estimated 300 “workers” took the free trip to Washington. The lobby day was
kicked off with a rally and press conference held in the Department of Commerce lobby and featuring
Treasury Secretary Summers and U.S. Trade Representative Barshefsky (see below for more on
Administration’s role).   The rally was followed by dozens of Congressional office visits  to show138
“worker” support for PNTR.   The overwhelming majority of the workers were not blue collar139
manufacturing workers as advertised, but well-paid airline pilots who stand to benefit from increased
flights to and from China regardless of whether they are only  carrying imports to the U.S. and flying
empty planes back to China.   Managers in suits were encouraged to change into pro-PNTR t-shirts140
before leaving to lobby Congress.141
The corporate lobby also sought to purchase inoculation from the opposition to PNTR expressed by
prominent Chinese political dissidents and democracy activists. While a large number of exiled
dissidents such as Wei Jingsheng, Harry Wu and Wang Xizhe lobbied regularly against PNTR,  the142
only pro-PNTR Chinese activists the corporate lobby could find were either in China (where real
activists are either in prison or face detention for speaking out against the Beijing regime and the
position of those listed as proponents cannot be confirmed), on fellowship to U.S. universities with
government support such as Dai Qing or from the business world, such as Hong Kong businessman
Martin Lee.     To obtain Chinese counterweights to the strong moral authority of the Chinese exiles143
who had suffered human rights abuses and wanted to keep the annual NTR review as a legitimate tool, 
Honeywell paid for airfare to bring several of its workers from a Honeywell facility in China to Capitol
Hill to testify to the fine conditions and high wages at the company plants.   To put into perspective the144
degree of coercion employers have over employees in China, workers caught circulating literature
about safety conditions or wages are regularly jailed.  The American Chamber of Commerce in China
sent a delegation of 30 businessmen from China, for the first time including eight Chinese members, to
visit 120 Members of Congress to pressure the House to vote for China PNTR, including insurance
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representatives from Lincoln Financial and New York Life Insurance Co. as well as the President of
Caterpillar China.145
The height of the Business Roundtable’s astro-turf efforts occurred the week of the China PNTR vote
when free 10 minute telephone calling cards attached to glossy cardboard flyers were handed out to
every commuter exiting Metro stations all over Washington.  The cards depicted an American flag
emblazoned with the slogan “The Right Call: YES on PNTR.” The flyer was essentially a Business
Roundtable fact sheet, with platitudes such as “by passing PNTR the U.S. gives up nothing,”146
deceptively ignoring the loss of an annual Congressional oversight vote to hold businesses operating in
China accountable.  The clean cut young people distributing the cards were hired to be political props.
Their next stop after handing out the phone cards was to be cheering fans of PNTR at a GOP
leadership rally amid balloons; the temporary workers position on PNTR, according to one, was that
“We just go where they tell us.”   The phone time on the calling cards distributed by the Tuesday147
before the vote was $40,000, not including the cost of the hired temporary workers.148
In addition, the corporate lobby spent expensively on “air cover” astro-turf, outdoing a similar effort
from NAFTA.  The Business Roundtable hired two public relations firms to generate a simulated
groundswell of support for NAFTA. One, Targeted Communications, operated a slick telemarketing
campaign in 30 congressional districts.  Targeted Communications sent mail-grams to the Member of
Congress on behalf of the people whom they had phoned up and talked into supporting NAFTA.  The
other firm, Dewey Square, tried to mobilize local business and civic leaders in 85 congressional districts
to actively push NAFTA.   Pro-PNTR business groups paid for similar phone banks to encourage149
retired employees to call their Members of Congress,  the regional Chambers of Commerce helped to150
mobilize phone calls to Congress within their local business communities.   Farmland Industries also151
provided resources and assistance for employees and the 600,000 farmer-owners of Farmland to
contact Congress.   While both of these efforts are substantial, they pale in comparison to the broad-152
based “air-cover” efforts launched by the pro-PNTR campaign which involved not only the business
coalitions, but also the member companies in generating the impression of public support for an
unpopular measure. 
Massive Corporate Advertising Blitz
The corporate advertising campaign had a similar goal.  Through television, print and radio
advertisements, the corporate campaign sought to create an impression of a national movement.
Advertising campaigns serve to supplement lobbying campaigns by focusing the public on issues before
the Congress and creating a concern in Members of Congress that their constituents could be
persuaded to the advertiser’s perspective.  According to Annenberg Public Policy Center, more than
$114 million was spent on issue advocacy advertising expenditures between January 1999 and March
2000, 52.6%, or $60 million, of it on legislative issue ads, like those promoting China PNTR. In the153
months leading up to the China PNTR vote, the business coalition, led by the Business Roundtable,
spent millions on pro-PNTR issue advocacy advertising.  The corporate campaign never revealed how
much it actually spent in total on the advertising element of its effort, but estimates of the Business
Roundtable-U.S. Chamber of Commerce campaign alone ran from $12 to $15 million.   154
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“If somebody’s on the margin and they screw
up this vote, they’d better not look to me for
money.” — Thomas Donohue, President U.S.
Chamber of Commerce
In comparison, the advertising campaign that pushed NAFTA, opposed health care reform, and the
advertising campaign underwritten by labor in opposition to PNTR are small. In the NAFTA campaign,
the Business Roundtable estimated that it spent a total of $10 million on all advocacy, with $8 million of
that money used to buy advertising time.   If the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Business155
Roundtable spent a similar proportion of its advocacy campaign money on advertising, their advertising
expenditures alone would be $12 million over only three months.  The first media buy in early March
was for $4 million, or the same as the entire expenditure on the $4 million dollars spent on the infamous
“Harry and Louise” anti-Clinton health care reform advertisements the Health Insurance Industry of
America for all of 1993.   The pro-PNTR advertising also dwarfs the amount of anti-PNTR156
advertising, where labor was outspent more than 6 to 1 with total television, radio and print
expenditures coming in at $2 million.    157
A Public Citizen survey of print advertising in
the Washington Post, New York Times,
Roll Call, National Journal, and a sampling
of other major print media found nearly $1
million in print advertising in addition to  the
Business Roundtable and Chamber print ads. 
The total spent by the corporate pro-PNTR
campaign in the three months between March
2000 and the vote in May on television, radio and print advertisements was at least $13.75 million —
by the primary trade associations pushing the legislation, other business groups, and many individual
companies.  This is a significant undercount, as much of the print, radio and television advertising by
individual companies and trade associations ran in smaller markets and targeted Congressional districts,
buys Public Citizen could not review.  Annenberg found that issue advocacy advertising averaged $4
million a month between January of 1999 and March of 2000, making the more than $4.5 million a
month spent on pro-PNTR issue advocacy advertising exceed the monthly advertising expenditures of
all issue advocacy over the previous 15 months.
During the PNTR fight this year, the Business Roundtable advertised heavily in the Washington market,
but it also focused its television advertising campaign on 27 Congressional districts.   As early as late158
January, the Business Roundtable began running print advertisements in six Capitol Hill publications
focusing on agriculture, manufacturing and high technology.159
In early April 2000, the Business Roundtable rolled out its initial advertising buy, a $4 million dollar
national television buy which ran on CNN and was supplemented with in-district television
advertisements in about 50 House districts, as well as print and radio.   The print advertisements,160
featured prominent endorsers of PNTR — either former Secretaries of State (see below), governors or
economists — ran in smaller local papers and often targeted specific Members of Congress as well as
more general pro-business messages.   The Business Roundtable’s advertising for PNTR mirrored161
what it offered on its website from 1999 which have pro annual NTR and pro-China in the WTO
messages: how NTR is good for agriculture, exports generally, automobile makers, citrus growers,
high-tech industry, the service sector, semiconductors, chemical manufacturers, telecommunications,
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Not only was the call free, but when the number
was contacted, an operator instructed the caller
about what to say, then connected them to the
correct Member of Congress and then
monitored the call to ensure a pro-PNTR
message was delivered to Congress.  If callers
asked members to oppose PNTR, they were
disconnected.
insurance, manufacturing generally, and pork producers.   Identical themes ran in BRT print162
advertisements for PNTR in political periodicals like Roll Call and National Journal.   The website also163
features the pro-PNTR television advertising including a generic “engagement” ad misleadingly
suggesting China’s markets will not open without PNTR, and that opening the market will bring
American values to China.   Another Business Roundtable television advertisement has American164
workers morphing into one another concluding that, “I work in America and trade with China works for
me.” This ad contrasted sharply with overwhelming labor opposition to PNTR based on the threat of
U.S. job losses and the lack of labor rights in China.165
The Chamber of Commerce also launched a
sixty second radio advertisement in
Washington and in targeted districts the week
of the large labor union rally against PNTR
which stated that “Voting yes for trade
strengthens our national security and opens the
door to good paying, American jobs.”166
Many individual companies and other trade
associations also focused resources on
advertising in favor of PNTR.  For example,
Motorola alone spent $1 million on television
and print advertising.   The Motorola ads167
marketed an idea — even if premised on myth —  like it markets its consumer goods.  (Motorola’s
product commercials running in China will be developed by Oliver Stone and run late next year ). The168
Motorola issue advertisements concluded on an ominous note, suggesting that unless Congress
approved PNTR, American firms would not have necessary access to China’s market.  Of course,
Motorola already has invested $3.4 billion in China before PNTR, making it the largest foreign investor
in China.   The Emergency Committee for American Trade ran television ads in 25 swing districts and169
the Electronic Industry Alliance ran radio advertisements featuring high-tech workers in 10 districts.170
Motorola’s television issue advertisements promoted a toll-free number to contact individual members
of Congress about PNTR.  The operation of this call-in system demonstrated the bottomless pit of
money corporations with interests in China were willing to expend.  Not only was the call free, but
when the number was contacted, an operator instructed the caller about what to say, then connected
them to the correct Member of Congress and then monitored the call to ensure a pro-PNTR message
was delivered to Congress.  If callers asked members to oppose PNTR, they were disconnected.171
Pass through phone banks typically cost between $10-$15 per completed call without the operator
lobbying and monitoring the call.  The Motorola advertising ran nationwide for weeks before the vote,
running up unknown but substantial costs for the pro-PNTR campaign phone calls in addition to the
direct cost of the television and print advertisement placements.
In February, ExxonMobil used its weekly quarter-page advertisement on the New York Times op-ed
page to promote PNTR with an ad entitled “A Bull Market with a China Shop” which urged “Congress
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to give priority to granting China PNTR” and contending that PNTR would “extend America’s bull
market and record growth.”   ExxonMobil used a second of its weekly ads on the Times op-ed page172
in mid-may to push for PNTR with the headline “Vision and Courage on China.”   ExxonMobil uses173
this prominent weekly space to promote the company, its philanthropy and its positions on political
issues like global warming and gasoline pricing.  The annual run costs $1.6 million, making the PNTR
ads cost nearly $62,000.  174
Major national newspapers were full of pro-PNTR advertising.  Illinois-based Motorola ran a $32,949
half-page advertisement in the Chicago Tribune in April stating that Congress had to agree to PNTR
to gain the WTO accession benefits, “Or the deal is off.”    The Toy Manufacturers of America ran a175
full page ad in the Times the week of the vote costing $100,000 contending that voting against PNTR
“isolates America and hurts our families.”   There also were a number of pro-PNTR advertisements176
that ran in the Washington Post in May.  Lucent ran a full page ad on May 18  that cost $82,756 andth
stated that the benefits of China’s WTO accession “will be denied to America” without PNTR, despite
statements to the contrary by U.S. Trade Representative Barshefsky and Commerce Secretary
Daley.   Boeing ran two two-thirds page ads in the Post costing a total $110,342 the weeks before177
the vote one entitled “How Much Opportunity Will America Lose,” and the other headlined “How
Much of America’s Economic Growth Are We Willing to Risk.”   The days before the vote, ACLI178
and Electronic Data Systems ran a quarter page ads in the Post costing $20,689 each.   Even after the179
vote the advertising continued.  The National Association of Manufacturers paid nearly $45,000 for a
half-page ad in the Los Angeles Times to thank the California Congressional delegation that supported
PNTR.180
Pro-PNTR companies and trade associations also advertised heavily in the semi-weekly political
newspaper Roll Call.  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce ran a full page advertisement trumpeting the
Governors and local Chambers of Commerce that support PNTR.   The ad publicized the pro-PNTR181
letter to President Clinton signed by 41 governors arranged by the Democratic Leadership Council, a
pro-business lobby within the Democratic party formerly led by then-Governor Clinton and currently
led by Vice Presidential Candidate Joseph Lieberman (D-CT).182
The Business Coalition for U.S. China Trade ran at least 3 advertisements in Roll Call — two entitled
“Fact Watch” contradicted that there will be any job losses related to the U.S. trade deficit with China
and another contending that China made all the sacrifices in the U.S. China bilateral agreement and that
it was of minor importance that the Congress was sacrificing annual NTR review costing at s much as
$27,900.   Microsoft, the Agriculture Trade Coalition, ACLI, Lucent, Intel, MetLife, the Technet183
coalition of information technology firms, and Merrill Lynch all sponsored pro-PNTR full page
advertisements in Roll Call costing $58,400.   Many companies also paid $7,900 apiece for full page184
advertisements in the political magazine National Journal, including Microsoft, ExxonMobil, Boeing, and
Motorola.  185
The U.S. High-Tech Industry Coalition on China paid for pro-PNTR radio spots in the districts of
undecided Republicans including Rep. Sue Myrick (R-NC) and Rep. John Doolittle (R-CA),  both of186
whom voted for the legislation.  The magazine of the telecommunications industry, Wireless Week,
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described the industry as spending “untold millions of dollars for ads on TV, radio, and in daily
newspapers like the Washington Post and USA Today.”   The Agriculture Trade Coalition,187
representing 85 farm groups and agribusinesses, spent $150,000 on radio spots in the two weeks
before the vote.  188
This massive advertising campaign supplemented the corporate lobbying, both face-to-face and astro-
turf.  The advertisements that ran in Washington were meant to demonstrate that resources were being
dedicated to the fight.  In the field, the advertisements brought the heat home, demonstrating the
corporations’ willingness to spend money locally for political purposes — a useful threat of later
electoral retaliation — and helped to generate calls to Congress.  The high-dollar television and radio
advertising campaign of the corporate China lobby’s campaign made a K Street corridor operation
have an almost omnipresent appearance in America, despite polling showing a vast majority of
Americans opposed PNTR.
The combinations of these expenditures — political donations, advertising, inside the beltway lobbying
and astro-turf campaigns to create the facade of  a movement — presented both formidable
enticements and pressure on House Members and then political cover in the form of “local” workers,
business leaders and Chinese activists who supported PNTR.  The tens of millions of dollars spent by
the pro-PNTR corporations drowned out what should have been a serious policy debate and instead
turned the China PNTR fight into a game of cash and carry.
White House Pressures: From Bully Pulpit to War Room
The efforts of the China business lobby were greatly enhanced by the cooperation of and coordination
by the Clinton administration.  Democratic leaders in the House of Representatives had strongly urged
President Clinton not to hold the China PNTR vote during the closing months of the 106  Congress. th
After six years of intense effort, the Democrats were poised to restore the majority in the House. 
Democratic Congressional leaders vividly recalled the chilling effect that the 1993 NAFTA vote had on
the activist zeal and voter turnout of the Democratic base in 1994 when turn out among labor
households plummeted and the Democrats lost the House for the first time since 1954.
Despite these exhortations, President Clinton’s eagerness to shift focus from his personal scandal to his
policy legacy prompted the White House to move ahead with the PNTR push.  The Clinton
administration’s lobbying blitz pushing China PNTR ranks as the largest legislative effort the White
House has made over the last two terms —  surpassing notable fights such as  NAFTA and health care.
 The White House’s full court press was essential to the business coalitions’ ability to round up the
votes to pass the controversial measure.  The administration corralled Democrats, which was necessary
because of the number of Republicans concerned about China’s human rights violations, especially the
limitations on religious freedom, and GOP concerns about national security.  Much of Clinton’s last
lame-duck year in office was focused on passing China PNTR, while other alleged priorities of the
administration, such as  gun control, labor law reform, and a minimum wage increase, withered in
Congress.  
29_________________________________________________________ Purchasing Power      
“I regret that trade policy has
inextricably linked with job creation. 
We try to promote free trade on the
mistaken ground that it will create
jobs. [But] it is difficult to find
credible evidence that trade has
impacted the level of total
employment in this country over the
long term.” — Federal Reserve
Board Chairman Alan Greenspan
The Washington Post characterized PNTR as a “must-win” issue for Clinton to cement his legacy.  189
Indeed, it appears that the administration wanted to win China PNTR at any cost.  Not only did the
administration’s lobbying crusade on China PNTR vastly outshine its other efforts to move more
traditionally Democratic issues, it appeared to violate the
federal law which prohibits using federal funds to urge
others to conduct grassroots lobbying of Congress.  The
law allows for normal executive-legislative
communications, but prohibits using funds for grass roots
lobbying or for “publicity or propaganda” purposes.  190
Interpretation of this policy has allowed for considerable
publicity activities.  However, during the White House’s
campaign to impose China PNTR on the American
people, the line which separates advocating the
administration’s position and urging others to advocate
the administration’s position was often blurred.  On at
least one occasion that line was clearly crossed
according to the General Accounting Office (GAO).
The well publicized, seamless interplay between the White House and corporate PNTR lobbying efforts
led Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA) to write to the General Accounting Office and request an investigation
into the White House China PNTR War Room.   The GAO undertook an investigation of the War191
Room and of additional executive branch departments (Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce,
Labor, Agriculture and the office of the U.S. Trade Representative) for possible violations of the
prohibitions against using federal funds to generate grassroots lobbying of Congress by others.   By192
mid-May, the GAO investigation had discovered the White House China War Room was staffed by
150 individuals, about 100 of whom came from the Agriculture Department, and that there was
extensive outreach and coordination with outside companies and trade associations.   The “smoking193
gun” was a White House internal email forwarded by a member of the White House PNTR War Room
to the National Pork Producers Council and the Farmland Cooperative System.  The email discussed
the threat posed by anti-PNTR activists passing out a newspaper piece written by an economist
suggesting that U.S. farmers would not gain from PNTR.  The email specifically urged the two
agribusiness associations to contact a particular representative “ASAP.”   194
The alliance between business interests, traditionally more closely tied to Republicans than Democrats,
and the Clinton Democratic White House mirrors closely the Administration’s
coordinated efforts to pass NAFTA in 1993.  Despite having campaigned his way into office on health
care, in his first year as president, Clinton put NAFTA on the top of his legislative priorities. 
The president used his officials to mobilize the public and the Democratic party to support NAFTA. 
But in 1993, less than a year after the president took office, his spokespeople, lobbyists and strategists
within the White House were not as well-known by the public or on Capitol Hill as they are now. 
Though the White House team shepherding NAFTA through Congress was prepared and politically
savvy, they were of considerably lesser stature than the Cabinet lineup employed to push China PNTR. 
The Administration NAFTA team and war room operation included two Cabinet level Secretaries,
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Lies and Spin: Some Things Never Change
In late April, the White House released a letter signed by scores of economists including 13 Nobel
laureates and nine former White House council of Economic Advisors supporting China’s WTO entry. 
The letter was notable in that it did not take a position on PNTR.  Regardless, the White House
characterized the letter signed by 148 economists as an endorsement of PNTR, a point most
publications bought and reprinted.  A similar economist endorsement letter appeared during the195
NAFTA fight.  In September of 1993, the White House promoted a letter signed by 283 academic
signatures, with the 12 living Nobel laureates, but without the weight of the former Economic Advisors.
However, the list of alleged endorsements has not been available from the original MIT organizer of the
letter, the White House or the Commerce Department, in part because reporters calling the signatories
found that very few had actually read the NAFTA text and at least 8 did not remember signing the letter.196
Treasury Secretary Bentsen and U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, and two White House
strategic staff, Rahm Emanuel and special consultant and “NAFTA Czar” William Daley.   Though197
Secretary Bentsen was formerly a Texas Senator, the other three were relatively unknown seven
months into the President’s first term. 
Six years later when the China PNTR legislation hit Capitol Hill, two essential things had changed.  The
White House officials were more well known by the Congress and the public.  But even so, given
growing public opposition to the corporate managed trade agenda, it had become necessary for the
Clinton administration to bring significantly more of its in-house resources to the China PNTR fight than
were necessary for the NAFTA fight.  
Commerce Secretary William Daley, one of the Administration’s most politically skilled members,  has
been the administration’s primary attack dog pushing corporate-managed trade since NAFTA approval
appeared to be in trouble in the summer of 1993.  He was lured away from his politically-connected
corporate law firm and the Chicago Democratic machine of his family, where his father was and his
brother is mayor, to become the “NAFTA Czar” in 1993.   The totalitarian title is fitting for an198
individual charged with imposing a corporate agenda contrary to the needs and wills of working people
onto the American public.  
Daley was also selected to head the China fight, but this time he had one of the largest government
agencies as his back-up in his role as Secretary of the Commerce Department.  Daley had the political
smarts to recognize that a much greater effort would be required to win China PNTR relative to
NAFTA given greatly expanded public awareness and opposition.  According to White House officials
reported in Roll Call, Daley was making 20 lobbying visits to House members a week and as many as
20 phone calls to lobby on PNTR each day in March alone.   In comparison, Secretary Bentsen made199
64 phone calls to Members of Congress and 85 face-to-face visits with Members total,  or about the200
number of calls Daley made in three days in March and the number of office visits Daley made in
March — months before the China PNTR vote.  
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“Many of us urging cooperation with China
are being accused of doing so for
commercial reasons.  As a chairman of an
international consulting firm, I inevitably
encounter clients who also do business in
China, though they are represent a very
small share of our total income.” — Henry
Kissinger
Meanwhile, the Clinton administration’s PNTR lobbying activity included as principals many more of its
top officials, including Secretary of State Madeline Albright, Defense Secretary William Cohen, 
Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, White House legislative director Chuck Brain, and national
security advisor Samuel Berger, as well as Commerce Secretary William Daley, Agriculture Secretary
Dan Glickman, and U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky.201
The large, high-level Clinton administration
team acted aggressively to overcome the
overwhelming opposition to their agenda and
pressed their case on Capitol Hill, in front of
industry groups, and with the public.
According to the White House, 68 speeches,
testimonies, and junkets to 21 cities were
made just between late February and the May
vote on behalf of PNTR by Clinton Cabinet
Secretaries and other high level Administration
officials.   U.S. Trade Representative Barshefsky testified or spoke on PNTR 30 times between late202
February and the House PNTR vote, according to the White House web site, including a breakfast at
the American Farm Bureau, the Economic Strategy Institute, the National Conference of State
Legislators and the Women’s National Democratic Club.  Secretary Daley logged the second largest
number of speaking appearances with 13, including a Life Insurance CEOs press conference, the
Electronic Industries Association annual meeting, and U.S. Wheat Associates.  Secretary Glickman
made 10 speaking appearances, including the Kansas Rotary Club, the National Association of
Agriculture Journalists, and the Commodity Classic.  Treasury Secretary Summers made 8 stump
speeches for the administration, National Economic Council Director Gene Sperling made 3 and other
administration officials including Administrator of the U.S. Small Business Administration Aida Alvarez
and Deputy Secretary of Treasury Stuart Eizenstat also spoke out in favor of PNTR.203
Despite many other pressing issues in the international policy sphere, even Administration agencies that
did not have the China PNTR campaign as official “first” priority gave the effort to pass PNTR
preference.  For instance, in April, at a gala dinner sponsored by media baron Rupert Murdoch,
Secretary of State Madeline Albright announced to a room of 200 U.S. and foreign officials: “The vote
on China trade may be the most significant economic and national security decision Congress will make
this year.”   Days before the vote, Albright flew to Denver to cement the vote of Colorado Democrat204
Diana DeGette (D-CO), rather than focusing U.S. 
diplomatic efforts on growing tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the renewed outbreak of
fighting in Sierra Leone.   Samuel Berger, National Security advisor to the President, spoke before the205
East Asian Institute of Columbia University in early May, presenting a national security argument in
favor of China PNTR.   U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke came from his206
New York post and was seen on Capitol Hill the day of the PNTR vote telling his subordinates about
the vote count.    Perhaps one of the clearest demonstrations of how much more effort was required to207
pass PNTR relative to NAFTA was the appearance the U.S. Ambassador to China, Joseph Prueher, 
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Vice President Gore’s China PNTR Role
Vice President and Presidential candidate Al Gore also strongly supported the bill, and after obtaining
an early AFL-CIO endorsement, worked to push its passage.  Once he effectively secured the
Democratic nomination, he started to personally lobby undecided House Members in late March.  208
While Gore’s role in NAFTA was high profile, his role in the China PNTR debate was arguably more
effective.  His lobbying for China PNTR after obtaining the early AFL-CIO endorsement sent a powerful
signal to House Democrats.  With a majority of labor unions boxed in by the Gore endorsement, House
Democrats used Gore’s actions as cover, even chastising the unions for supporting Gore while
pressuring House Democrats on China PNTR. The unions that had refused to endorse Gore early on, the
Teamsters and United Auto Workers, were the unions which retained leverage during the PNTR debate.
However, their efforts were undermined by the AFL-CIO’s conflicting message regarding Gore.  Indeed,
many analysts have concluded that Vice President Gore would have inveighed on President Clinton to
put off the PNTR fight had the AFL-CIO not given Gore its early endorsement.  Meanwhile, the Gore
presidential campaign is (at this writing) being managed by two NAFTA veterans, one of whom led the
PNTR effort.  Former Commerce Secretary Daley, of PNTR and NAFTA Czar fame, is now Gore’s
campaign manager.  Carter Eskew, the Gore campaign’s campaign consultant and long-time friend to the
Vice President, managed the Business Rountable NAFTA advertising account.209
in Washington in mid-May to lobby Congress in favor of PNTR.  He was called in despite all of the210
heavies already lobbying in Washington, the growing domestic unrest in China, and the growing
difficulties regarding China’s multilateral accession talks.  
While President Clinton telephoned and met Members of Congress in the campaign to pass NAFTA,
to overcome the public opposition to PNTR he had to conduct a more intense effort.  For instance, in
early April, the President traveled to San Jose, California to speak to an audience of high-tech
executives on PNTR and unveil a “new” PNTR convert, Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA).  This was
particularly disingenuous, as Rep. Lofgren has always been a solid vote for corporate-managed trade
with her staff disrupting an anti-PNTR briefing months before the Presidential stunt.    Again, in early211
May, the President flew to the Midwest to provide political cover for two Democrats whose votes he
should have been able to rely on without the efforts.  He did an event with pro-corporate-managed
trade devotee Rep. Tom Sawyer in Akron, Ohio then flew on to Shakopee, Minnesota, home of
similarly pro-corporate-managed trade deals Rep. David Minge (D-MN).   Clinton also made a212
special visit to Karen McCarthy (D-MO) in her district of Kansas City to ask for her support for
PNTR although McCarthy, a NAFTA survivor, stuck with her constituents and opposed PNTR.  The213
President invited a dozen Members of Congress to the White House to meet the Hong Kong
businessman Martin Lee in early May.   Clinton even used Cardinal John O’Connor's funeral as an214
opportunity to lobby undecided members.  After the funeral in New York, he generously invited Rep.
Rangel and the rest of the New York delegation make the trip back to DC with him aboard Air Force
One, where he gave an in-flight push for the bill.215
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Through mid-May, the President met with about 100 Members, mostly in small groups; once the vote
drew closer, Clinton focused on one-on-one meetings with undecided Democrats such as Rep. Richard
Neal (D-MA), Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX) and Rep. Max Sandlin (D-TX).   In late May, six216
more House Members were brought to the White House — Bud Cramer (D-AL), who voted for
PNTR after securing a pork-laden deal for his district (see below), Rep. Jim Turner (D-TX) who
horrified his strong anti-PNTR voter base by voting yes, Rep. Grace 
Napolitano (D-CA) who had already committed to opposing PNTR and did vote no, Rep. Owen
Pickett (D-VA) normally a pro-corporate-managed trade vote who voted yes, Rep. Bob Filner (D-
CA) who voted no, and Rep. Peter Deutsch (D-FL) who voted no.  The week of the PNTR vote,217
President Clinton dedicated several hours each day to contact undecided Democrats by phone or in
face-to-face meetings, White House officials said the day before the vote.218
Hired and Borrowed “Objective” Experts and Silent Partners
The White House delivered a raft of so-called experts supporting the China PNTR legislation.  In
NAFTA, ex-presidents Ford, Carter and Bush were trotted out as supporters (the then-living Nixon
was considered too controversial).    In the China PNTR fight these same presidents re-affirmed their219
commitment to free trade in general and the China PNTR measure in particular at multiple events.  220
For instance, in mid-November, former Presidents Ford and Carter joined President Clinton at a press
conference at the White House which made for a great media spectacle.221
However, in another demonstration of the inflation in public opposition since NAFTA, another “A-
Team” of former officials was additionally employed for the PNTR fight.  Former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, for instance, supported both NAFTA and PNTR with statements and press releases. 
However, the week before the PNTR vote, Kissinger was joined at a White House press conference
by former Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher and former White House officials 
Swartzenegger and Greenspan Endorse PNTR
The second most ridiculous PNTR lobbying episode (coming after the comical round of pro-PNTR calls
made by Arnold Schwartzenegger at the behest of Rep. Mary Bono (R-CA) ) was the Clinton222
administration’s constant reprisal of Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan’s support of
China PNTR.  Greenspan’s support of PNTR was presented as breaking news — twice — on May 8 and
18, 2000.  His identical statements garnered significant news coverage both times, even though no news
was generated and nothing particularly new was happening when Greenspan reiterated his position.  223
Moreover, in a note of irony not included in the repetitive news coverage, in some senses Greenspan
makes a poor spokesperson for free trade as he is on record arguing against the administration’s
position that free trade creates jobs.  As he said on April 16, 1999: “I regret that trade policy has
inextricably linked with job creation.  We try to promote free trade on the mistaken ground that it will
create jobs. [But] it is difficult to find credible evidence that trade has impacted the level of total
employment in this country over the long term.”224
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such as Alexander Haig, Brent Scowcroft, James Schlesinger, Robert McNamara, Mickey Kantor,
Leon Panetta, and Zbigniew Brzezinski.   Kissinger’s role epitomized the conflicts of interest between225
the sheen of foreign policy knowledge and seeming impartiality and many of the “experts” little-
discussed high-priced consulting business.  For instance, Kissinger’s financial interests included those of
Kissinger Associates, his membership on corporate boards and financial investment ventures with
vested interests in China PNTR.  Founded in 1982, Kissinger Associates charged U.S. firms $200,000
a year for advice and $150,000 a month to work on particular business problems, such as helping to
break into the Chinese market which Kissinger Associates has done for American Express, American
International Group, GTE, H.J. Heinz and ITT.   Kissinger also set up the American-China Society at226
the behest of the Chinese government.  Operated out of Kissinger Associates offices, its mission is to
introduce visiting Chinese officials to American business operators and opinion leaders.   227
Since founding Kissinger Associates in 1982, Kissinger had not revealed his business connections,
particularly related to China and trade agreements.  However, in 1997, that was about to subtly
change.   In 1989, Kissinger urged restraint in responding to the Tiananmen Square crackdown in a
column and on ABC.  Only after a Wall Street Journal reporter revealed the extent of his ties to
businesses with interests in China, did some newspapers acknowledge Kissinger was a consultant, but 
without referring to any connections to the topics of his articles.  The Washington Post started doing
this three years later, in 1992.   228
In a column in June of 1993, Kissinger applauded Clinton’s extension of Most Favored Nation  to
China without “specific conditions,” a not-so-veiled reference to human rights, without identifying his
corporate clients who loathed annual human rights disputes over China’s trade status.   In March of229
1994, he wrote that “The short term objective of a renewed Sino-American dialogue should be ...to
enable the administration to de-link human rights from MFN status once and for all,” once again failing
to identify his interests in eliminating the discussion of human rights and trade.   Later that year, he230
lauded the Clinton administration’s success in the endeavor of  “...decoupling [MFN] status from the
objective of promoting better human rights in China,” — no mention of even having clients, let alone
those with interests in China.   In 1995, Kissinger recommended “A moratorium on further unilateral231
steps in Washington by both Congress and the executive branch...to return to what peace, stability and
the human condition require,” suggesting that the U.S. should take no action without China’s permission
or else chaos, which is bad for business, might ensue.232
But in March of 1997, an investigative piece by John Judis in The New Republic revealed that all along
Kissinger had represented business trying to gain access to China.   The story, titled “China Town,”233
found that in 1995, Kissinger Associates helped GTE enter an agreement with China’s United
Telecommunications Corporation to jointly develop China’s telecommunications industry.   In a piece234
in June of 1997, Kissinger admitted, “...let me state here that I head a consulting firm that advises a few
clients with business interests in China,” but later re-enforced his desire for “full discussion of trade
relations,” and urged China “critics at home” to “give the relationship a chance.”   In a column that ran235
in July of 1997, Kissinger lamented that   Yet, in the same article, Kissinger listed trade as the first of
three important China key issues followed by proliferation and human rights.   When the “small share” 236
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Revolving Door Never Stops: Richetti Goes from White House to Industry and Back
Steven Richetti, White House deputy chief of staff, is the classic revolving door lobbyist — he has
worked for the Democratic party, and for the White House previously, for several hired gun lobbying
shops representing an array of corporations with  interests in the China fight and then was named as
Daley’s deputy for the China PNTR fight.  Richetti met with Chamber of Commerce president Tom
Donohue to plot strategy on China PNTR in late December of 1999.   Richetti, already in and out of the237
White House during the first Clinton term, has experience on the China trade issue from when he was
Allied Signal’s lobbyist on annual China NTR in 1996 at Public Strategies, the firm of former White House
Chief of Staff Mack McClarty.   He created Richetti Associates, which took in over $800,000 in 1997 and238
nearly $1.5 million in 1998.   Ricchetti & Associates lifted some clients from Public Strategies, including239
Allied Signal ($100,000 lobbying fee for Richetti &Associates), as well as other businesses interested in
PNTR such as Dow Agrosciences, MCI, Primestar, Lucent, the pharmaceutical giants Novartis and Eli
Lilly, as well as American Council of Life Insurance.  Richetti left the  private sector to return to the White240
House to help the President during the impeachment scandal and to coordinate the fund raising efforts of
the Vice President, First Lady, and Clinton.   Given the high profile political donations by the corporate241
China lobby, Richetti was the perfectly positioned to both advocate industry’s position on China and
direct corporate donors towards Al Gore and Hillary Clinton.
of Kissinger’s clients interested in China was challenged on William Buckley’s “Firing Line” television
program, Kissinger bristled; columnist Ariana Huffington suggested that Kissinger Associates’ client
Disney had much to gain from NTR, including resolving the attack Disney was facing from Beijing over
the release of its Dalai Lama-based  movie “Kundun.” Kissinger responded that he was merely
“advising” Disney.   Given that Disney’s CEO Michael Eisner made more than $5,000 an hour in242
1997,  one can surmise that the payment for Kissinger’s “advice” was not trivial.  243
Later in the 1990's, Kissinger became a member of the corporate board of Gulfstream Aerospace,
which produces aircraft — one of the few manufactured products China imports from the U.S.   In244
1999, Kissinger Associates merged operations with former Clinton White House Chief of 
Staff Thomas “Mack” McLarty creating a new Republican/Democrat-connected powerhouse,
Kissinger McLarty Associates in Washington.   In April of 2000, Kissinger Associates also formed a245
financial partnership with insurer American International Group and the Blackstone Group to parlay the
Kissinger connections into investment opportunities.246
Many of the other seemingly disinterested foreign policy “experts” who appeared at Congressional
hearings, on television and ran newspaper columns supporting PNTR also represent firms with business
interests in China or sit on their boards.  Former Reagan Secretary of State Alexander Haig heads the
consulting firm Worldwide Associates which represented United Technologies efforts to land billions in
Chinese contracts for airplanes and air conditioners.   When former National Security Brent247
Scowcroft testified before the Senate Commerce Committee in April, he focused on economic changes
in China, but did not mention national security concerns. He stated: “That now means, above all, the
privatization or marketization [trend in China], whatever word you use, of state-owned enterprises and
the creation of a modern banking and financial system,” and also “There’s no way most of these  state-
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owned dinosaurs could survive the competition which will come with WTO.”   He did not mention that248
he now  operates Scowcroft Associates which has China-related business interests,  including for
instance, setting up a meeting between Chinese Premier Li Peng and the Chairman of Chubb Insurance
in 1997.   General Colin Powell, respected by many Americans on foreign relations issues also249
worked for PNTR and has ties to businesses with stakes in the China PNTR fight.  Secretary of State
Albright cited Powell’s support for PNTR in a guest opinion in the Denver Post.   Powell himself250
telephoned undecided Representative Max Sandlin (D-TX) the Monday before the vote.   Powell also251
was used as an example of prominent PNTR supporters the Tuesday before the vote by an Eastman
Kodak spokesperson on the news television show “The Newshour with Jim Lehrer.”   What was not252
made clear is that Colin Powell is on the Boards of Directors of America Online and Gulfstream, both
firms with significant interests in PNTR.   253
Pigs in a Pork Barrel Poke
With the corporate cash, paid “experts” and lobbyist legions, and corporate astroturf was much more
intense than during the NAFTA effort, the capture of PNTR was a largely “privatized” operation. 
While the NAFTA vote was secured thanks to  major government pork barrel deals, in China PNTR
the corporate cash was king.  During the China PNTR fight, there were fewer pork barrel deals vote
trades for less money, appearing almost as an afterthought by the White House.  In part, this occurred
because of the bad faith the President generated in failing to come through with the NAFTA promises. 
Instead several experienced Members approached with deals insisted that the White House actually
deliver on funding promises before the PNTR vote, especially since remains for the Administration to
deliver.  
The Clinton-Gore administration made at least 10 deals with a few dozen Members of Congress.  The
China PNTR horsetrading played a different role than the NAFTA pork.  With the heavy lifting on the
China PNTR effort privatized to corporate cash — and a Clinton Administration severely hindered on
its bad record of delivering on NAFTA deals — pork barrel deals served more as political cover for
corporate compliant Congresspeople than as a decision maker.   254
Indeed, an analysis of who did go for China PNTR pork is revealing.  Senior House Members who
voted for NAFTA after obtaining a policy promise or pork barrel goodie did not go for deals and many
voted against China PNTR.  They had never obtained their promised deals and faced years of voter
wrath for their NAFTA vote.  For instance, Rep. Sam Farr (D-CA) was promised that cut flower
import surges from Mexico would be monitored and protected against.  Given this was a key NAFTA
concern in his district, he then voted for NAFTA.  However, four years later —  after 10% of flower
producers in his district had been driven out of business each year because of imports chiefly from
Mexico — Farr voted against Fast Track to expand NAFTA in 1998 and against China PNTR in
2000. However, since NAFTA and its political fallout, many new House Members have arrived. 
Several of these new Members of Congress did rely on deals to provide political cover for unpopular
pro-PNTR votes.  When the Administration reopened the trade candy store, seasoned Members of
Congress who were undecided on China PNTR demanded that their “deals” be completely fulfilled
before the China PNTR vote. For instance, Rep. James Oberstar (D-MN) announced broadly that he
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would oppose China PNTR unless the Administration funded Trade Adjustment Assistance for trade-
injured mining workers in his district not now covered by the program and changed current trade law to
deal with import surges of slab steel.  Oberstar told the New York Times: “I’ll take the heat if I can get
something for the people I represent.”  Yet, in a repeat of its past conduct on trade vote promises that255
should have served as a lesson for newer Members, the Administration failed to push the trade law
changes early on when it most needed Oberstar’s vote and then ran out of time.  Oberstar opposed
PNTR. 
The Administration’s PNTR deals-for-vote schemes were similar in that they mainly served as post-hoc
political cover for Members who had already submitted to corporate pressure to abandon their local
constituencies.  However, the deals fell into three different categories.  First, the Administration was
willing to accept modest legislative palliatives to the underlying PNTR bill to provide political cover for
Members who were feeling heat at home over labor and human rights concerns.  Second, some
Members were given old fashioned pork barrel spending for pet projects they could tout back home in
particular districts.  Third, some deals offered promises of local job-creating investment policies or job
retraining monies to alleviate the expected job losses from China PNTR.
A Meaningless Fig Leaf for those Supporting PNTR
In an attempt to provide cover for Members under corporate and White House pressure to support
PNTR, such as Reps. Benjamin Cardin (D-MD), John LaFalce (D-NY),  Nita Lowey and Karen256
Thurman who had expressed past concern about China’s human rights record and import surges from
Chinese factories, Rep. Sander Levin (D-MI) teamed up with longtime PNTR zealot Rep. Douglas
Bereuter (R-NE) to design a package to provide cover on these issues. The proposal  failed to provide
Congress with meaningful tools to pressure China to improve human rights, weapons proliferation or
violations of trade rules and it failed to replace the trade-related enforcement capacity and leverage
Congress would lose if it terminates its annual vote on China’s terms of access to the U.S. market.
Indeed, both the Clinton Administration and GOP leaders had declared opposition to any measures
that would apply trade policy leverage on China, such as by linking human rights or national security
with China’s trade benefits. In March, Clinton’s economic advisor Gene Sperling announced that the
Administration would oppose any parallel China legislation connecting human rights or national security
to trade.  GOP leaders also announced opposition to enforceable “side” measures linked to trade. 
Democratic Leader Richard Gephardt then announced his opposition to PNTR after months of
negotiation with the Administration convinced him that no effective parallel legislation was possible. 
However, revealingly, GOP leaders announced growing enthusiasm for the Levin-Bereuter proposal. 
Other Members seemed more sincere in their belief the Levin-Bereuter proposal could have some
positive effect.  For instance, Rep. Karen Thurman (D-FL) engaged in a long colloquy during the
House debate to thoroughly establish the link between her PNTR support, which shocked many of her
friends, and the proposal.  Yet, the PNTR bill did not include funding for the proposal, and, predictably,
given similar NAFTA deals, the House of Representative has failed to provide any funding to even
attempt to enforce the toothless proposal. The $21.2 million requested by the Clinton administration for
the operation of  the Levin-Beureter proposal was rejected by the Appropriations Committee less than
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a month after China PNTR passed, and as of this writing there is no funding for these provisions.  In
short, the Congress has already eviscerated what little political cover the Levin proposal provided.
New Empowerment Zones
In an effort to capture the votes of the remaining undecided or wavering inner-city Democrats (such as,
Ruben Rep. Hinojosa (D-TX), Rep. Shiela Jackson Lee (D-TX), and Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY)257
all of whom voted for the legislation) shortly before the PNTR vote President Clinton and House
Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) announced the creation of new empowerment zones, special tax
investment zones designed to spur inner city investment.  The urban renewal plan, costing $20 billion
over ten years was announced two days before the House voted on PNTR.   The program would258
expand the current number of empowerment zones from 31 to 40 and add an additional 40 less
ambitious “renewal communities” proposed by Republicans.  Twenty percent of these new investment
areas will be in rural areas.  The compromise on the empowerment zones was only reached when
Clinton agreed to eliminate capital gains taxes on assets acquired in disadvantaged neighborhoods and
held for five years.  Though Empowerment Zones do help disadvantaged communities acquire access
to needed capital, a General Accounting Office study found that in a survey of six Empowerment Zones
the majority of the new activity, 58%, did not relate to economic development.  259
Interestingly, Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY) represents a district in which his predecessor had already
swapped a trade vote for community development promises.  Rep. Floyd Flake, a Democrat who held
the Bronx district before Meeks,  met with President Clinton the day before the NAFTA vote in 1993. 
After the meeting, Flake announced his support for the controversial agreement, which many in the
New York City congressional delegation opposed.  Newsday reported that Representative Flake’s
decision was linked to a commitment that his district would be the recipient of federal funds through a
new Small Business Administration (SBA) lending program for small businesses.  President Clinton260
waited four years before he was willing to put this proposal for a new program on paper.  In December
of 1997, the Administration approved a new Certified Development Company (CDC) specifically
targeted for Rep. Flake’s Bronx district named the Bronx Initiative Corporation.   Among different261
mechanisms for local development, community groups are often critical of CDCs because many times
they are unresponsive to the communities they allegedly serve, they rarely fund job-creating enterprises,
and they are slow to allocate resources.
Indeed, it was not until February of 2000 that Bronx Initiative Corporation made its first financing deal,
six and a half years after the President made his promise and well after Rep. Flake’s retirement from
Congress.  BIC financed one third of a community health clinic, with half the funding provided by
commercial banks.   Ironically, the clinic is not even in former Representative Flakes and now Rep.262
Meeks’ district; it is in an adjacent district held by Representative Jose Serrano.263
Refurbishing Northrup Grumman Plant
Rep. Martin Frost (D-TX) had told labor leaders that he would follow Minority Leader Rep. Richard
Gephardt’s (D-MO) lead on China PNTR, which was to vote against it but not to pressure his
colleagues too strongly to vote against it.  Frost had voted for NAFTA, but was one of the prominent 
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$307,000 Per Vote: Congressional China Trip
Commerce Secretary William Daley and Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman both lobbied hard for China
PNTR. Part of their strategy included a plan to host two congressional delegations on trips to China to
guide Members through a Potemkin village version of China that concealed the real conditions facing
workers, farmers, religious adherents and political prisoners.  Originally, each trip was supposed to
shuttle 25 or more undecided Members of Congress to China to meet with carefully selected officials,
Chinese business leaders, academics and American business operators.   However, this expensive264
tactic did not work out as planned.  The White House suddenly canceled Secretary Daley’s delegation
the day before it was expected to depart, claiming there was a lack of interest among House
members.   However, an anonymous pro-PNTR representative disagreed, contending in an interview265
with the political bi-weekly Roll Call that Members were fearing the wrath of constituents and the media
upon their return, given how unpopular the China deal was publicly.   Even after canceling the first trip,266
only four Members of Congress went to China on the second and only trip.  Only two undecided
Congress members (Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY) and Rep. Ruben Hinojosa (D-TX)) and two pro-PNTR
Members (Rep. Greg Walden (R-OR) and Rep. Norman Dicks (D-WA)), joined Secretary Glickman.   A267
conservative estimate of the cost of the trip to China for four Members of Congress and a dozen Clinton
staff would still cost more than $614,365 in travel, lodging and expenses — or about $307,182 to move
each undecided member into a pro-PNTR vote.268
 
representatives who switched to oppose the President on Fast Track in 1998.  The Northrup Grumman
aircraft manufacturing plant is the largest employer in Frost’s district, employing 5,000 workers. 
Northrup Grumman had announced that unless the government payed for environmental cleanup costs
at the plant, it would to close the facility.  Former Governor Ann Richards had tried to secure funding
for the cleanup before which is estimated at as much as$100 million.  Some congressional sources put269
the costs of cleanup and upgrading the plant as high as $200 million.    Rep. Frost informed lobbyists270
that he would use his PNTR vote to pressure the Clinton administration to commit to having the Navy
pay for the plant cleanup and upgrade.  Yet, even with the funding, the plant’s future was uncertain. 
However, even after receiving $153,250 in political donations from members of the Business
Roundtable, Rep. Frost solicited Motorola to host an additional fund raiser.  After the Administration
committed to support Frost on refurbishing the plant, Northrup Grumman announced that it would stay
at the Grand Prairie assembly plant but it did not rule out selling the plant.   Frost then announced he271
would vote for PNTR. The day after the vote, Northrup Grumman announced that it might sell the
entire division that manufactures aircraft, which would shutter the plant in question.272
Federal Study of Job Losses Due to Imports
The approach of Rep. Ken Bentsen (D-TX) typified the reaction of even the most reliably pro-
corporate-managed trade to the broad public opposition to China PNTR.  Even though he was listed
as a pro-PNTR vote from early on by both PNTR opponents and supporters, he only formally
announced his support for the China legislation after the Clinton administration promised to issue an
executive order to create a commission to study the government program that monitors job losses
related to imports.  The promise was extracted after two meetings with the President and several other
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meetings with Cabinet Members which Bentsen played up in his district to provide the appearance that
pro-PNTR Bentsen had only decided to vote for the unpopular measure after obtaining something from
the Administration.273
Longhorn Pipeline Deal
In exchange for voting for PNTR, two Texas members, Reps. Solomon Ortiz and Silvestre Reyes,
asked the Clinton administration to come to a prompt decision about re-opening a fifty year old oil
pipeline that links Corpus Christie with El Paso and then goes on to Arizona and New Mexico.  More
than half of the pipeline was built in 1950.  Before it was left idle in 1995, it had a higher than average
incidence of oil spills.   BP Amoco and Exxon proposed to re-open the crude oil pipeline to pump274
gasoline westward from Houston.  Residential and environmental opposition to this proposal was high
because the pipeline runs through heavily-populated Harris County, and the Lower Colorado River
Authority found that a leak could contaminate 20 drinking water supplies serving 750,000 people.  275
The Texas Land Commissioner has refused to grant the pipeline the necessary easements to operate
because of past spills and leaks and a 1998 explosion when the pipeline was being tested that injured
one worker.   The city of Austin and independent landowners sued to stop the pipeline from being re-276
opened.  277
An initial Environmental Protection Agency environmental impact study found no significant 
impact, but was criticized as flawed by the Lower Colorado River Authority and Rep. Lloyd Doggett
(D-TX).  They asked for a new study to assess contamination and safety issues.   Despite assurances278
that the pipeline supporters only wanted the Environmental Protection Agency to make a final
determination about the Longhorn Pipeline, Rep. Reyes announced the week before the vote that in
exchange for supporting China PNTR he had asked that the EPA to cancel its planned study of the
environmental impact of the Longhorn Pipeline, essentially guaranteeing the controversial deal would be
approved.   The next week Reyes backtracked and insisted that he “did not ask the White House for279
a guarantee of a favorable decision.”   Meanwhile Austin Rep. Doggett announced he would oppose280
China PNTR if the Administration approved the pipeline.  Yet, even after Reps. Ortiz and Reyes
declared victory on their pipeline deal, Rep. Doggett ultimately voted for the legislation claiming that the
Administration had informed him that a decision would be made, but that approval was not guaranteed. 
New Zip Code and Bug Protection
Rep. Michael Thompson (D-CA) had several issues of concern before the Administration that he
wanted satisfied before he made his decision on PNTR.  A few weeks before the vote, Rep. Thompson
finally secured a new zip code for a wealthy portion of his district after years of effort, although he
insists it was not in exchange for his pro-PNTR vote.   But Thompson’s Chief of Staff indicated to the281
Associated Press that the Member understood the link between Administration action and Thompson’s
PNTR vote, saying: “When the White House contacted him about PNTR, he said, ‘It is nice to hear
from you now when I wasn’t getting my phone calls returned before.”   The 10,000 person town of282
American Canyon apparently did not want to share a zip code with neighboring Vallejo.  Rep.
Thompson had been trying to get a new zip code since 1992.  The new zip code became effective on
July 1, 2000.   Rep. Thompson also was interested in receiving federal assistance to fight the glassy283
winged sharpshooter, an insect pest threatening wineries in Napa Valley.   In late June, Vice President284
Gore announced that the federal government determined the pest constituted a federal emergency and
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would provide $22.3 million in aid to California, nearly twice the $14.3 million the state provides to
combat the bug.285
Maintain Obsolete Weather Station
Rep. Robert Cramer (D-AL) decided to support the PNTR bill after Commerce Secretary Daley
promised to make a decision about maintaining a weather radar station in Huntington, Alabama that
was slated for closing.  Rep. Cramer announced that his district needed to keep the station because of
frequent tornados that he contends would be tracked earlier — with better resident warning — if the
weather station remained operational.  However, the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration286
sought to close the weather station because the technology in the Huntsville radar station was at least
25 years old and was being replaced by the more accurate Doppler radar stations, three of which
overlap Rep. Cramer’s district.287
Administration Drops Federal Appeal of Fair Trade Court Ruling
The Clinton administration withdrew its appeal of a federal court victory by environmental groups.  The
court ruling required the Administration to include environmentalists on trade advisory committees
which have only included industry representation.  Within days of grandiose announcements regarding
new environment trade policy proposals, the Administration appealed the ruling, seeking to reverse the
requirement to add environmental interests.  The withdrawal of this appeal by the Administration was
aimed at securing the vote of Rep. Lloyd Doggett (D-TX), according to reports that informed sources
made to Inside U.S. Trade.   Rep. Dogget’s office refused to confirm or deny that his China vote288
hinged on the administration dropping the appeal.  Environmental and consumer groups involved in the
trade advisory cases opposed PNTR for China.
Extra Funding for Radio Free Asia/Voice of America
Even as the vote came down to the wire, legislators were attempting to secure funding for pet projects. 
The day before the vote, Rep. John Porter (R-IL) had still withheld his official support for PNTR,
demanding GOP leadership insert a provision onto the bill to a $99 million increase in  funding to Radio
Free Asia, which broadcasts American viewpoints into China, Vietnam, Laos, Burma and Tibet.   The289
GOP managed to meet Rep. Porter’s demands and then some: the PNTR that passed the House
included $133 million for Radio Free Asia in capital improvements and increased operating expenses to
expand the operation to the internet, get more stringers, and improve TV Mandarin, a Voice of
America Program.290
Conclusion
The push to pass China PNTR by the corporate-White House coalition was the most expensive
legislative campaigns ever waged by business.  The overwhelming flow of monies to campaigns,
congressional leadership and party fund-raisers, lobbyists and advertising polluted the free flow of ideas
converting public policy discussions into a commercial marketing venture.
 
Overwhelming public opposition to a trade policy that encouraged American businesses to relocate in
China, take advantage of lower labor and environmental conditions, and turn a blind eye to abuses of
human rights and religious freedoms was never in doubt or at issue.  The relative merits of different
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China trade policies was never seriously considered by a House of Representatives marinated in an
unprecedented torrent of money, swarmed by corporate lobbyists and paid “experts,” slimed in a
swamp of revolving door government and corporate players, topped with  White House pressures and
promises.
With American trade policy not being thoughtfully debated, but rather sold to the only bidder —
corporate special interests — the number of unemployed Congresspeople is as certain to rise with the
U.S.-China trade deficit.  While the corporate money can purchase power over the short term, in the
longer term person-to-person education and local political accountability cannot be overcome.  As with
NAFTA, following PNTR, a new set of Representatives will learn about the perils of pursuing
corporate-managed trade policy the hard way.
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